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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The diﬀerence in the development experiences between the most developed countries and the 
least developed countries of today is vast. While the inhabitants of Luxembourg enjoyed an 
income per capita of $77,783.5 in 2007, people in Liberia only had an income per capita of 
$385.6, which is close to subsistence levels.
1 Luxembourg‟s per capita income is 200 times 
larger than Liberia‟s. Even within the developing world, growth is very unequal. East Asia 
and parts of Latin America are growing at impressive rates, while many other countries – 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa – struggle with sluggish and volatile growth. Likewise, the 
degree  of  income  inequality  varies  sharply  from  the  developed  world  to  the  developing 
world, as well as among developing countries and entire regions. Latin America is infamous 
for being the world‟s most unequal region, while the catch-up countries in East Asia are 
much more equal  in  terms  of incomes  but  often unequal  in  terms  of  political  access.  In 
Africa, income inequality is smaller than in Latin America but poverty is widespread and 
political exclusion is a widespread phenomenon.  
While growth theory has proved a powerful device for understanding the proximate sources 
of  growth,  empirical  investigations  have  shown  that  much  of  growth  still  remains 
unexplained  by  factor  accumulation.
2  Total factor productivity growth (TFP) in growth 
models and growth accounting is a catch all concept for everything but primary inputs. Parts 
of TFP can be attributed to technological change, but it often remains a black box item, 
modeled exogenously. In new growth theory and evolutionary theory, technological change is 
endogenized and the question shifts to what determines the rate of technological change. This 
opens the door to institutional analysis. In this spirit, we argue that development must rather 
be viewed in historical perspective linking historically shaped  institutions, political and 
economic  inequalities,  and  long -run  development  paths  to  development  outcomes  and 
development chances today.  
In this paper, we provide an analytic review of the recent literature on the relationships 
between institutions, inequality and economic growth in the long -run, as well as the links 
between institutions, inequality and policy and growth in the short and medium term. We 
focus on the contributions to the study of long-run growth of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 
2002), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) and their critics. We also discuss the 
contributions of Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) and Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 
(2005) to the study of long-run and short-run growth. We analyze the underlying frameworks, 
models, empirical methods and data used to test the theoretical hypotheses.  
There is now a consensus that institutions matter for growth, but disagreement about how, the 
extent to which this is the case, and which institutional arrangements aﬀect growth more than 
others.  Over  time,  early  institutionalism  (e.g.  Veblen,  1899;  Commons,  1936;  Mitchell, 
                                                 
1 This comparison is based on purchasing power parity adjusted real GDP per capita in 2007 from the Penn 
World Tables version 6.3 (in 2005 prices). Luxembourg is the richest non-oil-based economy and Liberia is the 
poorest country for which there is data available in the PWTs in 2007. The subsistence level of GDP per capita 
is often assumed to be around $400 in 1990 prices.  
2 There is plenty historical and contemporary evidence for this (see, for example, Solow, 1956, 1957; Denison, 
1967; Abramovitz, 1989; Solow, 1991; Easterly and Levine, 2001; Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 2001).  2 
 
1910), post-WWII institutionalism (e.g. Gruchy, 1947, 1978; Kapp, 1950; Hirschman, 1958; 
Myrdal, 1968) and later New Institutional Economics (e.g. North and Thomas, 1973; North, 
1990;  Williamson,  1985)  have  oﬀered  varying  but  often  complementary  approaches  to 
linking diﬀerences in growth performance to institutions.  
Neither the early institutionalists nor neoclassical economists placed speciﬁc emphasis on 
intra-country income inequality. In early neoclassical economics, inequality was often seen as 
promoting  growth  through  higher  savings  by  the  rich  and  positive  incentive  eﬀects  (the 
equity versus eﬃciency debate).
3 Further, Kuznets (1955) hypothesized that inequality ﬁrst 
rises and then falls during the development process. Initially inequality increases as the result 
of urbanization, increasing urban-rural income disparities and a higher degree of inequality in 
the urban economy than the rural economy. Kuznets‟s (1955) assumption was that causality 
runs more from development to the income distribution and not from inequality to growth, so 
that in the long run high inequality is only a transitory outcome at middle-income levels. This 
theory is known as the Kuznets curve. Similarly, the earlier institutionalist literature mainly 
focused  on  factors  other  than  inequality,  such  as  catch-up  based  on  the  advantages  of 
technological backwardness and overcoming institutional deﬁciencies (Gerschenkron, 1962), 
escaping low-equilibrium traps though a big push (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943), or forward and 
backward linkages and economies of scale (Hirschman, 1958). The exception was Myrdal 
(1968), who saw inequality as an obstacle for growth, as rigid class and status structures 
inhibit an eﬃcient allocation of labor and talent.  
Since the 1970s, inequality became more widely seen as a possible barrier to growth, as 
newer  theories  suggested  that  a  more  equitable  distribution  could  contribute  to  positive 
growth dynamics (Chenery, Ahluwalia, Duloy, Bell and Jolly, 1974). But especially modern 
theory since the 1990s formalized how, given credit-market imperfections, inequality is a 
constraint to human capital investments (Galor and Moav, 2004), entrepreneurship (Banerjee 
and Newman, 1993)  and intergenerational  mobility (Galor  and  Zeira,  1993).  In addition, 
political  economy theory  suggested that  inequality directly harms growth through raising 
demand for taxation over time (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994;  Persson and Tabellini, 1994). 
These theories are accompanied by a vast and conﬂicting empirical literature on the direct 
eﬀects of income inequality on development.
4 
Economic inequality did not feature centrally in the institutional literature unti l Engerman 
and Sokoloﬀ (1997), who found that economic inequality in the age of colonization adversely 
aﬀects suﬀrage, schooling, banking and other institutions to this very day. Their approach 
links  factor  endowments,  inequality  and  institutions  to  long-run  development  outcomes. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) emphasize that political inequality and historical 
junctures matter. They relate the quality of colonial institutions set up by European settlers to 
the mortality rates of these settlers to explain subsequent development trends. Both theories 
                                                 
3This argument can be traced to Keynes (as discussed in Thirlwall, 2005) and was also made in the earlier works 
of Sen (1960). There is a tradition of this line of reasoning. For example, Lewis (1954) provided a model of 
economic development with unlimited supplies of labor. In the model, exploitation of cheap labor and inequality 
are directly linked to growth through the assumption that the rich capitalist classes are responsible for savings, 
investment and accumulation.  
4See, for example, Perotti (1996), Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro (2000), and Forbes (2000).  3 
 
oﬀer explanations for the puzzling “reversal of fortune” – the phenomenon that formerly 
relatively rich colonies have now become poorer and relatively poor colonies have become 
richer (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002).  
These studies,  however, have provoked  a critical  debate.  In the  case of Acemoglu  et  al. 
(2001) in particular, Albouy (2008) strongly criticized the underlying empirical methodology. 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) argued that human capital matters 
more for development than institutional explanations. Further, the research of Rodrik et al. 
(2004) weighs in on the debate on the primacy of diﬀerent “ultimate causes” of growth, 
which is often understood as an interplay between geography, institutions and integration into 
international trade. Rodrik also links studies of long-run and short-run growth by exploring 
growth  collapses  (Rodrik,  1999),  growth  accelerations  (Hausmann,  Pritchett  and  Rodrik, 
2005) and by developing methods for growth diagnostics (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 
2005, 2008; Rodrik, 2010).  
In  the  following  review  of  this  more  recent  literature,  we  use  the  sources-of-growth 
framework  by  Szirmai  (2008,  2012)  in  order  to  identify  the  most  pertinent  mechanisms, 
organize the literature, and analyze the interrelationships between inequality, institutions, and 
economic growth. In this framework, we distinguish between proximate, intermediate, and 
ultimate causes of growth, as well as socio-economic outcomes.  
Our review is guided by three broad working hypotheses. First, the institutional arrangements 
that shape human behavior are among the crucial determinants of the long-run economic 
growth performance of nations since 1500. Second, political and economic inequality aﬀects 
growth in two important ways: (a) indirectly by inﬂuencing both the nature of institutions 
which in turn have an inﬂuence on long-run growth, and, (b) directly by inﬂuencing the 
accumulation of human capital, one of the important proximate sources of growth. Third, past 
institutional  arrangements  aﬀect  the  degree  of  contemporary  economic  and  political 
inequality.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  brieﬂy  presents  our  framework.  Section  3 
reviews the authors/topics in the terms of their own theory and models, and presents some of 
the  most  important  criticisms.  It  consists  of  three  subsections,  for  the  works  of  (3.1) 
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, (3.2) Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, and (3.3) Rodrik. Section 4, 
the synthesis, discusses the results from section 3 building on the framework presented in 
section 2. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  THE FRAMEWORK  
Figure 1 illustrates our conceptualization of ultimate, proximate and intermediate causes of 
growth including socio-economic outcomes. The distinction between proximate and ultimate 
sources  of  growth  has  been  developed  by  several  authors  such  as  Maddison  (1988), 
Abramovitz (1989) and more recently by Rodrik (2003). The addition of intermediate causes 
and socio-economic outcomes is based on Szirmai (2008).  4 
 
Why is this framework useful? First, it allows us to highlight the diﬀerent levels of growth 
analysis. On the one hand, studies referring to long-run growth, or levels of GDP per capita, 
usually refer primarily to ultimate causality though sometimes trying to include variables 
capturing proximate and intermediate causality. On the other hand, studies of growth in the 
short and medium term mainly refer to intermediate and proximate causes and may attempt to 
link these with contemporary socio-economic outcomes. 
Figure 1: Proximate, intermediate, and ultimate sources of growth and development  
 
Source: adapted from Szirmai (2008). 
Second, using the framework we can visualize the concept of endogeneity, which is mostly a 
function of time and interdependencies with other variables. Analyses of ultimate causality 
are most challenged by endogeneity, as nearly every factor but geography is endogenous in 
the long-run. However, analyses of proximate causality also have to deal with endogeneity 
issues. For instance, as Rodrik (2003) notes, capital accumulation and eﬃciency in the use of 
resources are themselves endogenous. Causality may well run backwards from growth to 
accumulation  and  productivity.  Third,  it  helps  to  clarify  that  development  is  a  nonlinear 
process, subject to simultaneity and circular causation (Myrdal, 1968) at almost every level, 
as is evident from the many feedback relationships in Figure 1. This is closely related to the 
problem of endogeneity. Fourth, it allows us to distinguish between two important aspects of 
development: growth of productive capacity (GDP, cGDP) and socio-economic outcomes. In 
the following, we brieﬂy review the components of this framework.
5  
                                                 
5  See  Szirmai  (2008)  and  also  the  forthcoming  second  edition  of  “The  dynamics  of  socio-economic 
development” by Szirmai (2012) for a much more detailed discussion of the framework.  5 
 
The  proximate  sources  of  growth  (Denison,  1967;  Maddison,  1987,  1988)  are  directly 
measurable  sources  of  output  growth,  or,  in  other  words,  the  inputs  into  the  production 
function (for both classical and endogenous growth theory). We understand the equation in 
Figure 1 as the result of decisions of a variety of heterogeneous economic actors responding 
to constraints and incentives provided by policies and the institutional framework. In Figure 
1,   refers to output,  ,   and   refer to the primary factors of production capital, labor and 
natural resources, the exponent   refers to the eﬃciency with which the primary factors are 
used to turn intermediate inputs into ﬁnal goods and services.
6 
The term   denotes net income 
from capital investments and labor from abroad (net factor income) and   refers to colonial 
plunder and expropriation (negative) or voluntary transfers and development aid (positive).  
Once we have quantiﬁed the proximate sources of growth, we can subsequently explore their 
links with the wider economic and social sources of growth and development. Intermediate 
sources of growth refer to two types of factors: ﬁrst, trends in domestic and international 
demand and, second, economic, social and technology policies. Policies include a wide range 
of interventions such as trade policy, macroeconomic policy, industrial policy or subsidies to 
stimulate innovation and industry. They also include all kinds of social policies in the area of 
social protection/insurance, education and welfare, which aﬀect the distribution of the fruits 
of growth. Including demand as an intermediate factor in this framework shifts the emphasis 
away from conceiving of growth in the medium term and short term as only supply-side 
driven. 
Underlying both the proximate and intermediate sources, there are even “deeper” factors, 
which we call the ultimate sources of growth. These include economic, political and social 
institutions, institutional change, historical shocks, geographic conditions, long-run trends in 
scientiﬁc and technological knowledge, demographic conditions and trends, culture, basic 
social attitudes and capabilities, changes in class structures and relationships between social 
groups, and long-run developments in the international economic and political order. Many of 
these themes are analyzed in this review. For example, the critical junctures approach of 
Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  (2001,  2002)  and  much  of  their  subsequent  research 
emphasizes  the  historical  shocks  of  colonization  in  conjunction  with  demographic  and 
geographic factors, as well as the dynamics of the relationships between elites and the mass 
of the population.  
Socio-economic outcomes are what ultimately matter in development. However, we argue 
that  the  most  fundamental  engine  of  development,  especially  in  historical  perspective,  is 
sustained increases in productive capacity and output growth over long stretches of time. This 
statement  holds  although  many  contemporary  outcomes  can  be  positively  or  negatively 
altered even in the absence of growth and is not intended to downplay the feedback channels 
                                                 
6 The concept of eﬃciency as used here refers to everything that increases output per unit of primary input. It 
includes economies of scale, eﬃcient allocation of the factors of production within sectors (appropriate choice 
of technology), eﬃcient allocation between less productive and more productive economic sectors (structural 
change),  reallocation  of  resources  towards  more  dynamic  sectors  (structural  change),  eﬃcient  allocation 
between countries (specialization and comparative advantage), utilization of capacity and, last but not least, 
disembodied technological change. Disembodied technological change refers to changes in the state of our 
knowledge which cannot be measured through changes in the quality of capital and labor.  6 
 
that connect outcomes to proximate and ultimate causes. The degree to which productive 
capacity is transformed into desired social outcomes depends on the nature of social and 
economic policy (intermediate causality), institutions, and initial levels of social inequality 
(ultimate  causality).  This  interaction  between  outcomes  (inequality)  and  ultimate  causes 
(geography  and  institutions)  is,  for  example,  the  basis  of  the  theory  of  Engerman  and 
Sokoloﬀ (1997), whose contribution we review in the following section.  
3.  THE REVIEW  
3.1   The Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis  
In  a  series  of  papers  focusing  on  the  divergent  developmental  experiences  of  the  New 
World,
7  Engerman  and  Sokolo ﬀ  developed  a  controversial  theory  which  has  received 
considerable  attention  in  the  modern  literature.  They  focus  on  the  very  long-run  growth 
outcomes  and  regard  economic  inequality  as  the  core  factor  shaping  the  institutions  that 
account for the take-oﬀ of North America throughout the course of the nineteenth century and 
the subsequent relative decline of South America.  
Table 1: GDP per capita in selected New World economies 
   GDP per capita relative to the U.S.  
   1700  1800  1900  1997 
Argentina   -  102%  52%  35% 
Barbados   150%  -  -  51% 
Brazil   -  50%  10%  22% 
Chile   -  46%  38%  42% 
Cuba   167%  112%  -  - 
Mexico   89%  50%  35%  28% 
Peru   -  41%  20%  15% 
Canada   -  -  67%  76% 
United States (1985$)   $550   $807   $3,859   $20,230  
Source: Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000). 
They begin with a puzzle. During the 17th century there was parity in incomes between many 
colonies in South and North America. Some Southern colonies such as Cuba and Barbados 
even had higher per capita incomes than the USA (Table 1). Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 
2002) argue that the North was initially not economically attractive to early colonizers. Only 
later was this trend reversed, owing to diﬀerences in the institutional structures created during 
colonization. Until around 1700 the Southern colonies were very successful in raising GDP 
per  capita  and  specialized  heavily  according  to  their  comparative  advantage  in  primary 
products (such as sugar). At the same time, they created institutions based on high inequality 
and limited access to economic opportunities. In contrast, the greater homogeneity of the 
population in the North was reﬂected in the genesis of political and social institutions which 
allowed  for  broad-based  access  to  economic  opportunities  and  which  encouraged  human 
                                                 
7 See Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002, 2005), Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000), and the additional sources 




Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) consider growth the cumulative impact 
of incremental economic advances of many individuals participating in the economy. In the 
long run, with increasing economic diversiﬁcation, access to economic opportunities for a 
broad range of the population became the driving force behind continuous innovation and 
growth. This contrasts with a development path dominated by small and restrictive elites in 
the South. Hence, institutional developments oﬀer a credible explanation for both the timing 
and the scale of the reversal in prosperity between North and South in the course of the 19th 
century.  
While  all  former  colonies  had  a  high  marginal  product  of  labor  in  common,  the  factor 
endowments of the Southern regions made them more suitable for growing and extracting 
sugarcane, minerals and other high-value commodities during the early colonial period. A 
region‟s climate and quality of the soil determined the most proﬁtable commodity, and the 
size  and  density  of  the  existing  native  population  determined  the  initially  available 
workforce. Sugarcane exhibited large economies of scale and was most eﬃciently processed 
in large plantations exploiting native and imported slave populations. As slave trade was free 
and  priced  in  international  markets,  Engerman  and  Sokoloﬀ  (1997)  argue  that  the  sheer 
amount of slaves imported plus the fact that relatively more of them went to the South taken 
together allows us to conceive of slaves simply as a highly mobile production factor, ﬂowing 
to regions of high demand and proﬁt.  
In the South, it was precisely these factor endowments and the extreme inequality resulting 
from a small European elite governing a largely poor and enslaved population, which proved 
detrimental  to  the  emerging  institutional  structures.  In  the  North,  the  relative  large  and 
homogeneous European population relying on small-scale farming with little or no slavery 
created  institutions  favorable  to  later  economic  development.  Hence,  they  reject  theories 
linking development outcomes to the identity and culture of the colonizer
9 
and instead argue 
that  “the  colonies  that  later  came  to  make  up  the  United  States  and  Canada  were  quite 
unusual in the New World, because their factor endowments (including climate, soils, and the 
density  of  the  native  populations)  predisposed  them  towards  paths  of  development  with 
relatively  equal  distributions  of  wealth  and  human  capital  and  greater  population 
homogeneity as compared with the great majority of their hemispheric neighbors” (Engerman 
and Sokoloﬀ, 2002, p. 56).  
In the Americas and the Caribbean, the diﬀerent factor endowments resulted in three broad 
clusters of countries. The ﬁrst cluster (Barbados, Cuba, the West Indies, Saint Dominguez 
and Brazil) was characterized by large sugar plantations (e.g. Latifundia), a high percentage 
of immigrant slaves, and, as a result, a small European elite. The countries in the second 
cluster (the Spanish colonies of Mexico and Peru) were well-endowed with minerals and had 
                                                 
8 The price of homogeneity among the population of European descent was the complete marginalization and 
even elimination of the indigenous Indian population.  
9 For instance, Hartz (1964) explains the divergent development of South and North America by referring to the 
cultural  diﬀerences  between  colonists  from  the  Iberian  peninsula  and  northwestern  Europe,  which  were 
magniﬁed in the new world. The colonists from the Iberian Peninsula transferred regressive institutions such as 
Latifundia to South America, while the Northern European colonists transferred institutions which were more 
conducive to economic development.  8 
 
a tradition in mining. Mines also exhibit economies of scale but their workforce consisted 
mainly of a large native population in coerced labor rather than imported slaves and contract 
laborers. Combined with immigration restrictions enforced by the Spanish, these colonies 
also ended up with relatively small European elites.
10 The third cluster are the colonies that 
later became the United States and Canada (in particular those north of Chesapeake Bay). 
They were neither endowed with a warm climate and soil suitable for the production of sugar, 
nor was there a large native population.
11 These are similar clusters  – albeit with a new 
meaning – as in Fieldhouse‟s (1982) distinction between plantation colonies (e.g. Brazil), 
mixed colonies of settlement (e.g. Mexico), and pure colonies of settlement (e.g. USA).  
3.1.1   Institutions of (in)equality  
Central to their hypothesis is that precisely these factor endowments and patterns of colonial 
rule resulted in institutions which ﬁrst adversely aﬀected and then maintained an unequal 
distribution of wealth, human capital, and access to economic opportunities. Relying mainly 
on qualitative evidence, they give examples of how these inequalities manifested themselves 
in six particular institutional spheres: suﬀrage, schooling, land policy, taxation, patents, and 
banking.  
The  pace  of  the  extension  of  the  franchise  is  their  most  crucial  and  direct  evidence  of 
economic inequality creating political inequality. While all colonies restricted the right to 
vote  to  the  white  male  population,  the  North  quickly  abandoned  wealth  and  literacy 
requirements. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2005) attribute this to the greater homogeneity among 
the (white male) population in the North. In short, comparatively equal people demanded 
comparatively equal rights and would eventually get them. By comparison, the disparities 
within the Southern population allowed elites to close-oﬀ access to the ballot and maintain 
selection criteria based on correlates of status. In 1880, 18.3 percent of the U.S. population 
voted  in  secret  regardless  of  their  wealth  or  literacy,  while  in  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela only a very small percentage of the population voted. There, access 
to the ballot was restricted by wealth and literacy.  
Likewise,  access  to  schooling  also  displays  a  strong  divergence  across  the  hemisphere 
(Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002; Mariscal and Sokoloﬀ, 2000). At latest by the mid-1800s, the 
Northern colonies all had public, general tax ﬁnanced, and universally accessible primary 
schools. The wealthy colonies in South America, however, failed to develop broad schooling 
institutions and even the most progressive colonies trailed the North by almost 75 years in 
                                                 
10 In this category, it was mainly the practice of the Spanish to distribute land rights to small elites (the system 
of  encomiendas  and  haciendas)  and  the  limitations  placed  on  immigration  to  their  colonies  that  created  a 
structure very similar to the ﬁrst group. The two land regimes are often subsumed under the term Latifundia. 
Even when economies of scale in production were absent, the agricultural and industrial structure remained 
concentrated. However, the size of the European population was somewhat larger than in the pure plantation 
economies such as Brazil.  
11 However, the south of the United States was suitable for tobacco, cotton and other valuable commodities with 
economies of scale. Consistent with their theory, slavery is widely known  to have been prevalent in the South. 
Nevertheless, according to Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, the south is a special case as it inherited a large part of the 
institutions from the north through national legislation.  9 
 
terms of literacy. Limited access to schooling directly reinforced limited access to economic 
opportunities and via literacy requirements it limited access to the ballot box.  
The  diﬀering  land  policy  regimes  across  the  Americas  also  point  to  diﬀerences  in  the 
institutionalization of economic inequality. The more homogeneous white settler populations 
in the U.S. and Canada beneﬁtted from an institutionalized policy of granting land to small 
holders, however, often at the expense of the native Indian population. In 1900, nearly 75% 
of U.S. household heads owned land, and in 1901 in Canada, almost 90% of all household 
heads were land owners. In Latin America, landholdings were highly concentrated and large 
landownership predominated.  
Further, Sokoloﬀ and Zolt (2007) suggest that Latin America‟s reliance on consumption taxes 
and comparatively regressive tax systems are the result of elites resisting an increased tax 
burden on wealth,  income or property  –  all of which are more progressive. This  pattern 
extends further to patents and banking. Contrary to Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
U.S. patent system evolved particularly early, with low access barriers and strict enforcement 
of property rights (Khan and Sokoloﬀ, 1998).  
Diﬀerences in banking institutions can also be traced to the colonial period. Farmers and 
planters were already providing loans to each other in the early 18th century. In colonies with 
large estates, this exchange was limited to narrow elites, while in the Northern colonies a 
higher percentage of the population could provide collateral (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002). 
After  the  U.S  declaration  of  independence,  the  federal  structure  together  with  the  broad 
franchise (lower barriers to participation), then engendered a diverse and competitive banking 
system in which bank chartering was a routine administrative aﬀair. In Latin America, by 
contrast,  chartering  banks  was  tightly  controlled  and  restricted  to  a  narrow  elite  often 
associated with the national governments, resulting in few banks and limited access to credit.  
3.1.2   The model  
To summarize, the causal mechanism proposed by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) is a 
combination of exogenous factors predetermining a development path, based on greater or 
lesser economic and political inequality, and endogenous institutional dynamics that maintain 
path-dependence over time. Exogenous factor endowments (climate, soil, mining resources 
and  native  population)  determined  the  initial  conditions  of  the  colonies  during  European 
conquest from 1492 to 1700. At one extreme, a tropical climate, very fertile soil or mineral 
resources and a large non-European population were favorable to growing and extracting 
sugar, cotton, and other high-value commodities. The arriving Europeans used domestic and 
foreign slave labor to extract these resources. The size of the domestically available unskilled 
labor force and the imported unskilled slave labor inﬂuenced the relative share of Europeans, 
who simultaneously were the economic (and later political) elites. At the other extreme, a 
dispersed native population combined with soils and climates suitable to growing wheat or 
similar commodities created conditions in which plantation slavery was of little use, small 
farming was more eﬃcient and, as a result, Europeans represented a large proportion of the 
population.  On  the  basis  of  these  initial  allocations,  endogenous  institutional  dynamics 10 
 
evolve. Countries with homogeneous populations,
12 large European elites and low levels of 
inequality, develop institutions which provide broad access to political, educational and 
economic opportunities (e.g. broad franchise, accessible public schooling, easy access to 
capital and jobs). Broad access to opportunities in turn maintains lower degrees of inequality 
and promotes economic growth by providing more incentives to larger segments of the 
population.  Initially  homogeneous  countries  have  higher  human  capital  accumulation, 
broadly accessible savings and invest ment institutions, and better protection of property 
rights for both intellectual capital and land. As a result, the social and private returns to 
investment  are  more  closely  aligned  (North  and  Thomas,  1973).  In  countries  with 
heterogeneous populations, high degrees of inequality and small European elites, the elites 
created institutions of unequal access (e.g. limited franchise, limited schooling, and limited 
property rights for the non-elite population) to capture economic opportunities. These diverse 
colonial experiences matter even today, as institutional path dependence and the reinforcing 
features of higher or lower inequalities created time-persistent institutions.  
Figure 2: The causal link of inequality, institutions and long-run growth  
 
 Source: authors‟ illustration. 
Engerman  and  Sokoloﬀ  (1997,  2002)  argue  that  the  eﬀects  of  economic  and  political 
inequality are intrinsically linked. In their theory, economic inequality often brings about 
political  inequality.  When  the  colonizers  arrived  in  South  America,  it  was  the  de  facto 
economic inequality vis-à-vis the native population which then became institutionalized in 
the de jure structure of the political system and institutionalized access to economic and 
political opportunities. However, they make the qualiﬁcation that this relationship only seems 
to hold in countries were unskilled labor was abundant (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2005). In 
conditions of abundant unskilled labor (natives or slaves), scarce capital and scarce skilled 
labor (Europeans), it is economic inequality rather than political inequality that results in the 
emergence of institutions that favor the owners of scarce factors of production.  
The theory has both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it is historically rooted and 
based on detailed country narratives without the loss of theoretical generality. On the other 
hand,  it  is  questionable  how  well  the  hypothesized  mechanisms  apply  outside  the  New 
World. The later colonies of occupation in Asia (Fieldhouse, 1982) followed a very diﬀerent 
logic. Colonizers were intervening less in the existing institutional structures of indigenous 
societies. Further, Africa was colonized comparatively late in the 19th century but has been a 
                                                 
12 In this context, homogeneity has two diﬀerent meanings which need to be distinguished. On the one hand, 
homogeneity refers to more egalitarian societies, and on the other hand, it refers ethnic or racial homogeneity, 
where the European settlers have succeed in marginalizing or even eliminating the indigenous population. In 
many ‟heterogeneous‟ countries in South America relatively more of the indigenous population has survived.  11 
 
net slave exporter since the 15th century. Other confounding factors can be pointed out for 
Asia or even Europe. However, Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) do not claim the theory 
to  be  universal.  This  raises  the  question  whether  the  causation  running  from  economic 
inequality to political inequality is just one of many possible mechanisms. Untangling the 
concepts of economic inequality, political inequality and institutions is necessary to examine 
these relationships. This distinction is only beginning to emerge in the literature and poses 
additional  diﬃculties  in  cross-country  research,  especially  for  indicators  and  theories  in 
which access to institutions (political inequality) is a key feature of „high quality institutions‟.  
3.1.3   Criticism and econometric evidence  
The mechanism proposed by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) proved controversial and 
provoked a series of empirical investigations seeking to conﬁrm or discredit the relationship 
between economic inequality, institutional development and growth. We concentrate on the 
recent cross-country studies of Easterly (2007) and Nunn (2008a), combined with additional 
evidence the case study oﬀered by Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin and Robinson (2007) for 
Cundinamarca, Columbia. The key issue in all of these studies is to what extent economic 
inequality  is  really  the  causal  factor  that  determines  institutions  and  growth,  or  whether 
political  inequality  or  the  existence  of  slavery  as  such  are  alternative  explanations  of 
economically ineﬃcient institutional structures and economic stagnation.  
Easterly (2007) operationalizes the theory of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) and uses 
the exogenous variation introduced by climate and soil to directly test the causal link between 
intra-country income inequality, the level of GDP per capita, the quality of institutions, and 
schooling  levels.  Building  on  Engerman  and  Sokoloﬀ‟s  argument  that  the  cultivation  of 
wheat had positive eﬀects and growing sugar had negative eﬀects on economic inequality, he 
derives  a  novel  wheat-sugar  suitability  ratio  as  an  instrumental  variable  (IV)  for  income 
inequality.  Instrumental  variables  are  commonly  used  to  identify  the  direct  eﬀect  of  an 
endogenous variable on an outcome in one causal direction, without actually observing it or 
being able to estimate it directly. As the degree of inequality is in part an outcome of the 
growth process itself, it is subject to reverse causality. Moreover, it is measured with great 
imprecision. Using a valid instrumental variable introduces exogenous variation in income 
inequality, which can be used to overcome endogeneity, isolate the causal eﬀect and shift the 
problem  of  measurement  error  away  from  the  instrumented  variable  to  the  instrument. 
Easterly (2007) calls the variation introduced by this instrument “structural inequality”, i.e. 
inequality  which  reﬂects  historical  events  captured  by  the  wheat-sugar  suitability  ratio 
including conquest, slavery and land distribution by the state or the colonial power. He tests 
the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) specifications:  
                            (1) 
                               (2) 
  where      is  the  outcome  variable  of  interest  (log  GDP  per  capita,  institutions,  or 
schooling),      is  the  Gini  coefficient  of  income  inequality,      is  the  log  wheat-sugar 
suitability ratio, and     is the transpose of a vector of covariates affecting all variables. 12 
 
The  results  of  the  regression  analyses  for  GDP  per  capita  are  striking.  A  one  standard 
deviation increase in the (instrumented) Gini coeﬃcient leads to a 1.1 standard deviation 
reduction  in  income  levels.  Similarly,  institutional  quality
13  declines  by  one  standard 
deviation and schooling
14 
by 1.3 standard deviations. The speciﬁcations are robust to various 
changes and additions, such as controlling for natural resources, climate, and colonial/legal 
origin dummies. He concludes that structural inequality has a large and signiﬁcant direct 
eﬀect on GDP per capita and an indirect eﬀect through its negative impact on institutions and 
schooling. This is in line with the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) hypothesis. Nevertheless, at 
least  three  caveats  are  worth  noting.  First,  Easterly  uses  a  sample  comprising  the  whole 
world, thereby extending a theory based solely on the New World colonies to virtually every 
country‟s  development  path  regardless  of  its  idiosyncratic  circumstance  and  history.
15 
Second, the robustness of cross-sectional cross-country instrumental variables regressions is 
debatable and depends strongly on the quality of the instrument used. Third, the causal 
mechanism is only tested indirectly and depends on the channels hypothesized by Engerman 
and Sokoloﬀ  (1997,  2002).  Structural  political  inequality  that  coincides  with  economic 
inequality  today  could  be  driving  this  relationship,  without  necessarily  having  originated 
from economic inequality.  
A second and more detailed study aiming to investigate the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) 
hypothesis was conducted by Nunn (2008a). His analysis approaches the theory on multiple 
levels but focuses on slavery resulting from endowments favorable to larger scale farming as 
the primary mechanism in determining inequality and growth outcomes. He only analyzes 
colonies  in  the  New  World  and  does  not  claim  universal  applicability  of  the  theory. 
Consequently, his approach has several advantages, such as the use of rich and detailed data 
for relevant countries, and a focus on the precise mechanism of slavery induced inequality. 
However,  without  instrumental  variables  inferences  of  causality  are  merely  tentative  and 
could  be  the  result  of  either  meaningful  or  spurious  relationships  depending  on  the 
unobserved factors.  
In a ﬁrst examination of a set of 29 New World colonies, Nunn (2008a) ﬁnds that the fraction 
of slaves in the total population in 1750 has a signiﬁcant and large eﬀect on GDP per capita 
in 2000. His baseline model begins with the assumed reduced form relationship between 
slavery, population density and income directly:  
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13 Easterly (2007) measures the quality of institutions by using the average across all composite indicators of the 
World Bank‟s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1999). Easterly (2007) also uses their separate dimensions but ﬁnds that the results remain very similar across 
the board, which he attributes either to the inadequacy of the indicators in identifying separate dimensions, or to 
the eﬀects of a dominant elite simply being similarly detrimental for all types of institutions.  
14 Schooling is measured as the average of secondary enrollment rates from 1998 -2003 with data from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI).  
15 Interestingly, the exclusion of the Americas increases the negative e ﬀects of the instrumented inequality 
coeﬃcient as opposed to weakening the relationship.  13 
 
  where      is the log of GDP per capita,       is the slave population as a fraction of the 
total population,       is the total population per unit of arable land, and     is the transpose 
of a vector containing the country of origin of the colonizer.
16 
The eﬀect of slavery on institutions is illustrated in the partial correlation plot below.
17 He 
provides an example to illustrate the scale. Jamaica had 90% of its population enslaved in 
1750 and has a GDP per capita of $3,640 (in 2000). If Jamaica‟s proportion of slaves would 
have been only 46% (close to the Bahamas) then GDP per capita would be more than 200% 
higher today (approximately $11,580). These results seemingly conﬁrm the basic premise of 
the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) hypothesis.  
Figure 3: Partial correlation plot of slavery in 1750 and income in 2000  
 
Source: computed using data from Nunn (2008a)  
However, in a second examination of the British West Indies only, Nunn (2008a) casts doubt 
on the proposed mechanism of higher inequality  in countries with  widespread plantation 
slavery. Restricting the sample to the British colonies in the West Indies allows for the use of 
richer data on the size of the plantations and numbers of slaves, and indirectly controls for 
heterogeneity  by  concentrating  on  a  more  homogeneous  group  of  colonies  with  similar 
characteristics. Nevertheless, this also reduces the sample size to a mere 12 countries. He 
modiﬁes the speciﬁcation in two ways to diﬀerentiate between plantation and non-plantation 
slavery (3) and to distinguish by size of slave holding (4):  
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16 Colonizer dummies are central the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) hypothesis, as Spanish colonies had fewer 
slaves but nevertheless high inequality (see the description of country clusters).  
17 The outliers are easil y identiﬁed on the graph. Nunn (2008a) removes the obvious candidates to test the 
robustness of his speciﬁcation. Omitting the USA and Canada (countries with lower slave proportions) weakens 
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  where notation  is  as  before.  In (4), the indices  denote plantation slavery  (P) or non-
plantation slavery (NP). In equation (5), (S) is defined as the ratio of slaves on small slave 
holdings to total population, (M) as the ratio for medium size slave holdings and (H) as the 
ratio for large slave holdings. 
Diﬀerentiating between  non-plantation slavery  and large plantation slaves  in  1830, Nunn 
(2008a)  ﬁnds  that  the  former,  rather  than  the  latter,  has  the  most  detrimental  eﬀect  on 
development. The eﬀect of non-plantation slavery is nearly twice as large as the eﬀect of 
planation slavery. Similarly  when diﬀerentiating by  the size of the slave holdings, small 
holdings have a nearly four times higher eﬀect than medium sized holdings, and two times 
higher eﬀect than large holdings.
18 Contrary to the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) hypothesis, 
Nunn (2008a) concludes that the institution of slavery per se, rather than the size of the slave 
holdings, predicts negative eﬀects on economic development.  
Finally,  Nunn  (2008a)  uses  data  at  the  state  and  county  level  in  the  U.S.  to  verify  this 
relationship  and  examine  whether  causality  runs  from  plantation  slavery  to  economic 
inequality and subsequent GDP levels. He runs two separate simple OLS regressions:  
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  where notation is as before and    is the Gini coefficient of land inequality in 1860. The 
first  specification  used  data  from  1860  only  and  the  second  specification  changes  the 
dependent variable to log GDP per capita in 2000. 
Two main eﬀects emerge. First, in the USA the eﬀect of slavery on development is negative 
but only diﬀers minimally between small and larger slave holdings. Second, using the Gini 
coeﬃcient  of  land  inequality,  the  fraction  of  slaves,  and  population  density  in  1860,  he 
conﬁrms  that  slavery  caused  economic  inequality.  However,  when  regressing  per  capita 
income in 2000 on land inequality, the fraction of slaves and the population density in 1860, 
slavery  independently  has  a  highly  signiﬁcant  negative  eﬀect,  while  inequality  is  even 
positively  related  to  income  per  capita.  For  Nunn  (2008a),  these  ﬁndings  contradict  the 
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) hypothesis, which states that inequality negatively inﬂuences 
income levels and implies that the coeﬃcient of slavery should become insigniﬁcant once 
inequality is accounted for. However, Nunn gives insuﬃcient recognition to the fact that the 
North-South  divide  in  the  U.S.  is  put  forth  as  a  special  case  in  the  original  argument. 
According to Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002), the south was generally unsuitable for sugar 
cultivation and hence the share of slave plantations and total use of slaves was never as great 
as in the Caribbean or Brazil. Further, many of the key institutions in the southern states were 
determined nationally after 1864 and through competition with other states in the union. As a 
result, the South of the USA became more competitive and open than its counterparts with a 
                                                 
18 Small holdings refers to 10 or less slaves, medium size holdings refers to 11 to 200 slaves, and large size 
holdings  refers  to  201  or  more  slaves.  The  size  of  the  holding  is  highly  correlated  with  non-plantation  or 
plantation slavery and larger slave holdings cluster with sugar, coﬀee and tobacco plantations.  15 
 
stronger  legacy  of  slavery  in  South  America  (Engerman  and  Sokoloﬀ,  2002,  p.  86). 
Therefore, causal inference based on the USA only might be problematic at best.  
Further  emphasizing  the  independent  eﬀects  of  any  kind  of  slavery  on  institutions  and 
development, Nunn (2008b) shows in a related paper on Africa how the export of slaves is 
negatively associated with current economic performance of the countries of origin. This is 
an interesting extension of the body of work by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002), as not 
only the use of slaves but also their production and export were detrimental for a country‟s 
institutions and development paths. The causal mechanisms in slave exporting countries are 
quite  diﬀerent.  Slavery  hindered  the  formation  of  larger  ethnic  identities,  contributed  to 
ethnic  fractionalization,
19  and  subsequently  led  to  underdeveloped  political  institutions. 
However, slavery is only one of the factors inﬂuencing the development of African political 
institutions, which were also inﬂuenced by very diﬀerent patterns of political centralization 
and nation formation.  
Acemoglu et al. (2007) study the state of Cundinamarca, Columbia, to directly test whether 
economic  or  political  inequality  shaped  the  region‟s  institutional  structure  and  long-run 
growth  outcomes.  They  construct  four  measures  of  inequality:  a  Gini  coeﬃcient  of 
landownership in 1897 and 1890, an overall Gini coeﬃcient for landownership including 
non-land  owners,  an  index  of  political  concentration  (operationalized  as  the  number  of 
individuals having held mayoral oﬃce over the number of times a mayor has been appointed 
between  1875  and  1895),  and  an  index  of  overlap  between  land  inequality  and  political 
concentration.  They  estimate  the  impact  of  these  variables  on  both  long-term  outcomes 
(primary/secondary enrollment, urbanization, and poverty in 1993) and medium-term socio-
economic outcomes (literacy, urbanization, and access to non-educational public goods in 
1937). Their baseline model is:  
                                              (8) 
  where    is average land inequality in 1890 and 1897,    is political concentration in the 
period from 1875 to 1895,    is the overlap measure,    is contemporary land inequality and 
    is the transpose of a vector of covariates affecting all variables. 
In  most  of  their  regressions  on  contemporary  outcomes,  a  higher  land  Gini  is  positively 
associated with schooling and urbanization, but negatively associated with poverty. However, 
political  concentration  is  negatively  associated  with  schooling  and  urbanization,
20  but 
robustly correlated with higher poverty. For medium-term outcomes, the only robust link is a 
negative association of political inequality and literacy in 1937. In these speciﬁcations too, 
the land Gini often enters positively. The eﬀect of the overlap measure is very small and 
insigniﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. They repeat the exercise without the overlap measure and 
with the overall land Gini (including non-land owners) in addition to the traditional land Gini. 
The overall land inequality has a negative sign but remains mostly insigniﬁcant. The land 
Gini is positively associated with the outcome variables, yet often insigniﬁcantly. Political 
                                                 
19 Ethnic fractionalization is an obstacle to development in its own right (Easterly and Levine, 1997).  
20 The eﬀects of land inequality and political constraints are only signiﬁcant at or above the 10% level for the 
secondary schooling and basic needs (poverty) regressions.  16 
 
inequality remains negatively associated with the outcomes and is sometimes signiﬁcant. For 
the poverty and access to public services outcomes all signs reverse, as before. Further, they 
show that political leaders disproportionately amassed more wealth with every year in power 
and  that  the  probability  of  becoming  a  land-owner  is  higher  for  politicians  than  the 
probability of becoming a politician for landholders.  
The pattern clearly contradicts the theory put forth by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997), which 
emphasizes  the  primacy  of  economic  over  political  inequality.  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2007) 
conceptualize  the  results  based  on  weak  versus  strong  institutionalization  of  the  polity,
21 
meaning the strength of institutional constraints placed on political actors. Cundinamarca had 
few constraints on political actors and it was easy for them to consolidate their hold on 
power. In some regions, a separate land -holding elite could thus prove a critical political 
counterbalance and check on political concentration, as indicated by the positive e ﬀects of 
high land inequality vis-à-vis the negative eﬀects of political concentration. This explanation 
opens  up  a  plurality  of  possible  interactions  between  economic  inequality,  political 
inequality, and elite conﬁgurations.  
In sum, out of the many relationships reviewed here some prove very robust and others raise 
issues requiring further research. Slavery is detrimental to institutions and growth both for 
slave importing and exporting countries, regardless of the size of slave holdings, or if in the 
form of plantation or non-plantation slavery. Whether this eﬀect is an independent eﬀect of 
slavery,  or  if  it  works  through  economic  inequality,  or  political  inequality,  or  any 
combination  of  these  is  uncertain.  Future  studies  of  long-run  growth  need  to  distinguish 
between political and economic inequality. Further, economic inequality can lead to political 
inequality and hinder development but the conditions under which this is the case must be 
strictly identiﬁed. Political inequality by itself can be a considerable barrier to schooling and 
development. Further, while case studies add to our understanding of the processes involved 
they  also  introduce  considerable  complexity  into  the  reasoning,  which  challenges 
parsimonious theory.  
3.2   The critical junctures hypothesis  
The  institutions  and  growth  studies  of  Acemoglu,  Robinson,  Johnson,  and  collaborating 
authors  concentrate  on  three  broad  themes:  institutions  and  long-run  growth  in  former 
European  colonies,  formal  theories  of  dictatorship,  democracy  and  development,  and 
empirical  analyses  of  democratization.  We  concentrate  on  two  of  their  seminal  papers 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002), as these oﬀer an explicit theory of development for former 
colonies and establish a causal link running from institutions to growth. Their models of 
dynamic games between citizens and elites are used to corroborate and specify the underlying 
mechanisms, conceptualize the role of inequality, and broaden the scope to the origins of 
regime  types  in  general.  Further,  we  review  their  critical  work  on  the  modernization 
hypothesis as an alternative theory of development and highlight some of the criticisms of 
                                                 
21 This concept draws on a previous paper by Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) and incorporates insights 
from Bates (1981).  17 
 
their  approach  and  theory  put  forth  by  Albouy  (2008)  and  Glaeser,  La  Porta,  Lopez-de 
Silanes and Shleifer (2004).  
3.2.1   Colonial origins  
In  an  inﬂuential  paper,  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  (2001)  develop  a  theory  and 
provide evidence of the reasons behind the diverging paths of comparative development in 
former colonies. They argue that the institutions set up by former colonial powers diﬀer 
vastly, ranging from “extractive states”, as in the Belgian Congo, to the “neo-Europes” of the 
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In their view, these diﬀerent institutional 
conﬁgurations are due to the varying sizes of European settlements relative to the native 
population, which were in part determined by the inﬂuence of the actual and perceived local 
disease  environment  on  Europeans.  For  example,  the  local  population  in  Africa  and  the 
Caribbean  was  partly  immune  to  yellow  fever  and  malaria,  while  as  much  as  80%  of 
European deaths in the tropics can be attributed to these two diseases (Curtin, 1989). As a 
result, colonies with low settler mortality were predisposed to become colonies of settlement 
with inclusive institutions and strong protection of property rights, whereas in colonies in 
which  Europeans  had  lower  survival  chances  extractive  states  emerged.  According  to 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Europeans essentially brought their institutions to where they could, 
or  created  extractive  institutions  where  they  could  not  settle  in  large  enough  numbers. 
Applying the categories of Fieldhouse (1982), the theory essentially states that pure colonies 
of  settlement  inherited  institutions  of  private  property  rights,  while  mixed  colonies  of 
settlement  and  plantation  colonies  resemble  points  on  a  continuum  towards  political  and 
economic insecurity.
22 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that key features of the institutions set-
up  during  colonization  persist  until  today,  even  though  the  political  systems  of  former 
colonies underwent many changes since. Akin to the earlier work of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ 
(1997), their theory focuses on the initial conditions Europeans faced in the colonies and how 
these predetermined highly dissimilar development paths. This “critical junctures” approach 
emphasizes  the  role  of  historical  factors  in  shaping  institutions,  the  political  system  and 
development outcomes. However, contrary to Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002), they do 
not stress factor endowments and inequality, but settler mortality, as the determining factor of 
the size of European settlements relative to the native population. Following Acemoglu et al. 
(2001), the model can be summarized as a system of equations:  
                            (9) 
                                (10) 
                                (11) 
                                   (12) 
                                                 
22 Interestingly, Acemoglu et al. (2001) do not distinguish between periods of colonization. Implicitly, trading 
posts or colonies of occupation had similar eﬀects on institutions as mixed or plantation colonies. However, in 
the latter two Europeans intervened heavily in the indigenous structures, while in the former the inﬂuence of 
Europeans was intentionally marginal. The theory treats extractive institutions in Africa, which was colonized 
late and only brieﬂy, equivalent to those in Latin America, which was colonized early. This time eﬀect is only 
captured  indirectly,  though  high  (potential)  settler  mortality  in  large  parts  of  Africa  eﬀectively  deterring 
Europeans from large-scale settlement.  18 
 
  where      is  the  log  of  GDP  per  capita  for  country   ,      is  a  measure  of  “current 
institutions”,    is a measure of “early institutions”,    is a measure of people of European 
descent,      is  the  log  mortality  rate  of  the  settlers,       is  the  transpose  of  a  vector  of 
covariates affecting all variables and the  's are the coefficient vectors. Only   ,   ,    and 
parts of     are actually observed. 
The advent  of European colonialism  can be regarded  as  a natural  experiment  of history. 
Acemoglu  et  al.  (2001)  propose  an  innovative  instrument  for  exploiting  this  historical 
juncture to  estimate the causal eﬀect  of institutions  on national  income. They argue that 
settler  mortality  is  exogenously  determined  by  geographic  factors  and  should  not  be 
systematically correlated to any unobserved factors inﬂuencing development today in any 
other  way  than  through  institutions.  Therefore,  it  can  be  used  to  isolate  the  variation  in 
institutions due to diﬀerences in settler mortality and to infer the causal eﬀect of institutions 
on  income  levels.  Their  preferred  measure  of  current  institutions  (  )  is  an  index  of 
protection  against  the  risk  of  expropriation  (averaged  from  1985-95),  which  assesses  the 
strength of property rights
23. Their settler mortality  (  ) data is mostly taken from Curtin 
(1989, 1998) and Gutierrez (1986). To operationalize the theory, they test a two-stage least 
squares model consisting of equation (9) and the following collapsed version of equations 
(12) to (10) as the first stage specification:  
                              (13) 
The results point to a very large and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of property rights institutions on 
long-run economic performance. In their baseline estimate, the resulting coeﬃcient is 0.94 
with a standard error of 0.16. They provide an example to illustrate the scale. The diﬀerence 
between Chile and Nigeria is 2.24 points on the expropriation index and they are “typical” in 
the sense that they are close to the regression line. The expected diﬀerence in GDP between 
Nigeria  and  Chile  is  7.24-fold  while  in  reality  the  distance  is  11.46-fold.  Hence,  the 
diﬀerence in institutions explains more than 60% of the diﬀerence in economic performance 
between these two countries. The strength of the relationship is illustrated in the regression 
plot of the instrumented (predicted) values of the expropriation index and the logarithm of 
GDP per capita in 1995 in Figure 4 below.  
The results are robust to controlling for the identity of the colonizer, religion, climate, soil 
quality, natural resources, landlocked countries, diseases, and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. 
The  identity  of  the  colonizer  has  been  argued  to  be  a  decisive  determinant  of  current 
institutions  (e.g.  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1999).  However, 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) ﬁnd that this eﬀect is only relevant for British origin and just about 
signiﬁcant  at  the  5%  level.  They  conclude  that  Britain  primarily  colonized  places  where 
settler mortality allowed larger settlements relative to the native population and verify that 
the  coeﬃcient  on  institutions  remains  about  the  same  when  investigating  former  British 
                                                 
23 Knack and Keefer (1995) ﬁrst published this comprehensive index encompassing many institutional features 
(rule of law, repudiation of contracts, corruption in government and the quality of bureaucracy) based on data 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Previous studies used revolutionary coups or assassinations 
to proxy for the risk of expropriation/property rights, but produced questionable country rankings. The ICRG 
data and the Knack and Keefer (1995) index have since become standard use in the literature.  19 
 
colonies  only.  Contrary  to  the  hypothesis  of  –  inter  alia  –  McArthur  and  Sachs  (2001), 
geography  and  climate  seem  to  have  no  independent  eﬀects  on  GDP  per  capita  once 
institutions are treated as endogenous.  
Figure 4: Plot of predicted expropriation risk and GDP per capita  
 
Source: computed using data from Acemoglu et al. (2001)  
3.2.2   Reversal of fortune  
In  a  second  major  contribution,  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  (2002)  systematically 
document and analyze a reversal in income per capita among former European colonies. They 
argue that, particularly during industrialization, institutions can be causally linked to this 
reversal and extend their theory to incorporate population density as a determinant of initial 
conditions.  In  addition,  they  cast  further  doubt  on  theories  linking  modern  development 
outcomes to geographic factors.  
While the data on per capita income in 1500 are fragmentary estimates at best, historical 
accounts  suggest  that  many  of  the  pre-colonial  civilizations  in  South  America  were 
comparatively richer than those in North America but also than New Zealand and Australia.
24 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that urbanization and population density can be used as proxies 
to measure prosperity before the advent of colonization. In their view, urbanization is a direct 
measure  of  development,  as  it  required  an  advanced  network  of  transportation  and 
agricultural surplus to be sustainab le. To validate this assumption they show how highly 
urbanization and income are correlated when considering both cross-sectional and panel data 
since 1913. However, in theory population density is less strongly linked to GDP per capita. 
This weaker link is, for example, explained in Malthus' classic argument. On the one hand, 
Malthus associates growth of population with increasing standards of living, but, on the other 
hand, he also stresses the checks and balances of famine and hunger as food production f ails 
                                                 
24 The reversal essentially took place among colonies that later became known as the Western Oﬀshoots and all 
others. For GDP per capita estimates see, for example, Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997), Sokoloﬀ and Engerman 
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to  keep  up  with  population  growth.
25 
In  recent  cross-sections,  population  density  is  not 
associated with prosperity, which Acemoglu et al. (2002) attribute to the changed nature of 
the relationship between income and number of children. Nevertheless, population density 
and urbanization in 1500 are highly correlated, which for Acemoglu et al. (2002) justiﬁes the 
use of both in the analysis, in spite of the Malthusian principle.  
Figure 5: Urbanization/log population density in 1500 and log GDP per capita in 1995  
 
Source: computed using data from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002). 
They ﬁnd that urbanization in 1500 and income per capita in 1995 are signiﬁcantly negatively 
correlated  (see  Figure  5  above).  The  estimated  coeﬃcient  on  urbanization  is  -0.078. 
Consequently, a 10% decrease in urbanization results in an approximately two times higher 
GDP per capita in 1995. These results just about account for the current income diﬀerence 
between, for example, Uruguay and Guatemala. They repeat the analysis using log population 
density  in  1500.  The  coeﬃcient  is  -0.38  and  is  highly  signiﬁcant.  A  10%  increase  in 
population density results in 4% lower per capita income in 1995. The results are robust to 
various controls, instrumenting urbanization with population density, changes in the sample, 
and alternative assumptions. In most extended speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients change only 
minimally. When both population density and urbanization are included, urbanization enters 
positively but insigniﬁcantly, while population density enters negatively and signiﬁcantly. 
Interestingly, when examining countries that were never colonized the relationship between 
urbanization or population density and GDP per capita is positive, conﬁrming the relevance 
of colonialism as a natural experiment or critical juncture. Acemoglu et al. (2002) place the 
timing of the reversal at the onset of industrialization, which they corroborate by showing 
that the great divergence in urbanization rates, industrial production and per capita income 
                                                 
25 Speciﬁcally, higher living standards led to quicker ovulation in women, more successful pregnancies and 
more surviving children/adults. Before 1800 higher standards of living meant faster population growth, but these 
were preludes to so-called Malthusian catastrophes, such as the Great Famine (1315-1317) and the Black Death 
(1346-1351). Faster population growth also increases the scarcity of resources and land and reduces output per 
worker. Food supply could not keep up with population growth and, as a result, the standards of living declined 
again until population growth averaged zero. Much of the institutions literature is focused on how property 
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between the Western Oﬀshoots and all other colonies did not occur until the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Before the 19th century many colonies had higher urbanization rates (per 
capita income) than the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  
How can this reversal be explained? Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that neither the “simple” 
nor the “sophisticated” geography hypotheses, which have been put forth in diﬀerent variants 
by many authors (e.g. Lewis, 1978; Myrdal, 1968; Sachs, 2001; Diamond, 1997), can account 
for this phenomenon. According to Acemoglu et al. (2002), the simple geography hypothesis 
suggests  that  time-invariant  factors  (such  as  natural  resources,  a  coastline,  and  good 
conditions  for  agriculture  or  health)  have  lasting  eﬀects  on  development.  In  the  view  of 
Acemoglu et al. (2002), proponents of the sophisticated geography hypotheses, in turn, argue 
that  time-variant  geographic  factors  inﬂuence  development.  These  are,  for  example,  an 
interaction of the most suitably grown crop with plowing technology, or the interaction of 
geographically  determined  transport  costs  and  industrialization.
26  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2002) 
succinctly summarize the two hypotheses as follows:  
                                    (14) 
                                                       (15) 
  where       is GDP per capita in country   and time  ,    are time invariant geographic 
characteristics,      is  the  state  of  technology  at  time   ,        are  time  variant  geographic 
characteristics,     is a general time effect, and       are country-time specific effects. The 
simple version (14) concentrates on   , while the sophisticated version (15) argues that    
has the most important effect. 
Like Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2002) suggest that, contrary to the 
geography hypothesis, it is in fact European colonialism which led to the reversal of incomes. 
They deﬁne two criteria as central for growth-enhancing institutions: well-deﬁned private 
property  rights  (aligning  private  and  social  returns)
27  and inclusive institutions (enabling 
broad  participation  in  productive  opportunities).  When  secure  property  rights  are  only 
applicable to a wealth-owning or political elite they are not suﬃcient for lasting development. 
Their  key  argument  is  that  “European  colonialism  not  only  disrupted  existing  social 
organizations, but led to the establishment of, or continuation of already existing, extractive 
institutions  in  previously  prosperous  areas  and  to  the  development  of  private  property 
institutions in previously poor areas” (Acemoglu et al., 2002, p. 1263).
28  
                                                 
26 There are very elaborate arguments and models behind what Acemoglu et al. (2002) call the “geography 
hypothesis”;  we  follow  their  simpliﬁcation  here  as  we  are  mainly  concerned  with  the  robustness  of  the 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) model. For more detail see the original authors as referred to in the text above, but also 
McArthur and Sachs (2001). Many of these authors ﬁnd distinct roles for geography and institutions. However, 
econometrically the debate has centered on establishing if geography has an independent eﬀect on per capita 
income or if it is entirely captured by institutions. The possible (direct or indirect) inﬂuence of geographic 
determinants is widely acknowledged and is evident in the inclusion of a variety of geographic controls in 
virtually all of the model speciﬁcations in this line of research.  
27 This is the main point of North and Thomas (1973). 
28  It is not entirely clear how a continuation of already existing and the new establishment of extractive 
institutions can both be determinants of the reversal at the same time. Strictly following the logic of Acemoglu 22 
 
Extending their earlier work (Acemoglu et al., 2001), they now identify two initial conditions 
as relevant determinants of the development paths of former colonies. On the one hand, the 
initial population density determined how much labor was available that could be enslaved or 
coerced to work in agriculture or mining. Densely populated areas were also more highly 
developed and often had a functioning tax system, which could be captured by the arriving 
Europeans.  On  the  other  hand,  the  feasibility  of  settlements  (i.e.  settler  mortality  rates) 
determined how large the proportion of European descent would be relative to the native 
population  and  in  absolute  numbers.  In  areas  of  low  density  and  low  settler  mortality, 
European settlement in large numbers was easier. A larger relative quantity of Europeans also 
translated into a social stratiﬁcation similar to their countries of origin, and the lower strata 
would demand rights comparable to those present in their country of origin. Interestingly, 
they attribute no distinct role to the diﬀerences in (weapons) technology between Europeans 
and  native  populations,  which  varied  sharply  from  early  colonization  conquests  to  later 
campaigns (e.g. in Asia).  
Acemoglu et al. (2002) test their theory utilizing a speciﬁcation similar to that presented 
earlier  in  equations  (9)  and  (13)  with  settler  mortality  serving  as  an  instrument  for 
institutions, but including either urbanization or the natural log of population density in 1500 
as additional explanatory variables. Their results show that both measures of early prosperity 
become  insigniﬁcant  once  institutions  are  endogenously  determined,  while  in  all 
speciﬁcations  the  coeﬃcient  of  institutions  remains  relatively  large,  positive  and  highly 
signiﬁcant.
29 
They conclude that this strongly suggests that the strength of property rights 
institutions accounts for the reversal.  
To further investigate why this change in relative incomes occurred during the late 18th and 
early 19th century, they hypothesize that countries with better property rights protection and 
more inclusive institutions were better able to capitalize on the opportunity to industrialize. 
According  to  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2002),  three  mechanisms  could  have  potentially  barred 
countries with elite institutions and low property rights from industrializing quickly. Insecure 
property rights for non-elites could have prevented suﬃcient entrepreneurial investments, 
elites  could  have  intentionally  blocked  industrial  investments  as  the  returns  would  have 
beneﬁtted non-elites, and new technologies might bring about political discontent or threats 
to elite power. Using panel data and either a country‟s industrial output or per capita income 
as their dependent variable, they test this hypothesis in two ways. First, they use estimates of 
UK industrial output as a proxy for the opportunity to industrialize and interact it with their 
measure  of  institutions.
30  Second,  they  instrument  their  institutions  measure  with  an  
                                                                                                                                                        
et al. (2002), it can be argued that a continuation of already existing extractive institutions does not change the 
status quo and renders colonialism irrelevant as an institutional intervention. These two can only be reconciled if 
industrialization is the key determinant of the reversal and colonialism matters only in shifting the institutional 
set-ups  in  some  but  not  necessarily  all  colonies.  In  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2002),  this  distinction  is  not  always 
apparent.  
29 They report their results using three di ﬀerent measures of institutions, namely average protection against 
expropriation risk (1986-1995), constraint on the executive in 1990, and constraint on the executive in the ﬁrst 
year after independence. The coeﬃcient on these measures ranges from 0.37 to 0.88, depending on the measure 
used and the additional controls.  
30 The measure of institutions is “constraint on the executive” from Gurr‟s Polity III database, as it has a long 23 
 
interaction  of  log  settler  mortality  and  UK  industrial  output.
31  For  both  strategies  and 
dependent variables, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term of institutions and UK industrial 
output is large and signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations (the magnitude is in the order of 0.132 to 
0.206 for industrial output and 0.078 to 0.159 for log GDP per capita). They extend their 
models by allowing for an interaction between industrial output and geography (latitude) 
according  to  the  time-variant  geography  hypothesis  in  equation  (15).  Its  coeﬃcient  is 
insigniﬁcant by a large margin in all speciﬁcations.  
3.2.3   The model  
Combining  theory  and  evidence  from  the  two  papers  presented  above,  the  model  of 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) can be summarized schematically (see Figure 6 below). As a 
preliminary  caveat,  they  explicitly  acknowledge  that  such  a  parsimonious  theory  is  only 
possible in the colonial context and that some of the reported relationships are very diﬀerent 
– if not the opposite – in countries that were never colonized. Hence, colonialism is merely 
one of many critical junctures, albeit one of great signiﬁcance.  
Figure 6: The causal link of institutions and long-run growth  
 
Source: authors‟ illustration. 
The institutional structure and subsequent long-term  growth outcomes in former colonies 
were severely aﬀected by the initial conditions faced by the settlers. A dense indigenous 
population, relative prosperity and comparatively high settler mortality led to “extractive” 
institutional structures aimed at transferring surplus produce and rents to Europeans. These 
societies  were  characterized  by  a  small  European  elite  or  appointed  indigenous  elite, 
exclusive institutions, few constraints on the executive and underdeveloped property rights 
for a majority of the population. Their political and economic systems relied on coercion, 
hierarchy,  frequently  even  dictatorship  and  deeply  enshrined  inequalities.  In  contrast,  in 
regions  that  were  sparsely  populated,  relatively  poor  and  endowed  with  a  disease 
environment favorable to settlement, the resulting institutional structures were non-coercive, 
allowed broad access, stronger protection of property rights, and limited the powers of the 
executive. Geography matters, but only in determining the initial conditions which in turn 
shaped early institutions. It has no independent eﬀect apart from predisposing entire regions 
to  diﬀerent  institutional paths.  Endogenous  institutional  dynamics  maintained the adverse 
                                                                                                                                                        
time-series dimension going back to the ﬁrst year of independence. 
31 Their panel model specification is as follows:                         ̅              and   ̅  is instrumented using 
          , where      is either industrial production per capita or GDP per capita of country   in year  ,    are 
time effects,    are country effects,   ̅  is the average of institutions across all  ,    is UK industrial output per 
capita, and    is the log of settler mortality. 24 
 
characteristics of early colonial institutions throughout time, as elites had few incentives to 
change the underlying institutional structure for fear of losing power, or engaged in eﬀorts to 
maintain power even when the structure of the political institutions changed. Their model is 
very similar to Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997), but stresses mortality and initial density rather 
than  factor  endowments  as  determinants  of  the  size  of  European  settlements.  Further, 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) emphasize the distribution of political power more than the 
distribution of economic resources in their explanations of the causal mechanism.  
Acemoglu  and  Robinson  (2000a,b,  2006,  2008)  constructed  several  formal  models  to 
corroborate the mechanisms mentioned above and to expand their theoretical reach beyond 
former  colonies.  To  illustrate  the  issue  of  persistence,  Acemoglu  and  Robinson  (2008) 
present  a  model  in  which  citizens  and  elites  are  engaged  in  a  contest  for  their  favorite 
institutional  structure  (democracy  and  non-democracy).  The  model‟s  main  result  is  that 
democratic reform altering the de jure power of elites vis-à-vis citizens may be partially or 
entirely oﬀset by eﬀorts of the elites to invest more in de facto political power. In some cases, 
the  greater  advantage  of  citizens  in  democracy  may  even  lead  to  such  intense 
counterbalancing  eﬀorts  by  the  elites  (through  bribes  and  other  mechanisms),  that  the 
democratic arrangement is economically less eﬃcient than non-democracy. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008) call this captured democracy – a state in which the political institutions are 
“pro-citizen” but the economic institutions are designed to serve the interests of the elite. In 
their model, only simultaneous political and economic reforms reducing the gains of elites 
from controlling political institutions make adverse outcomes considerably less likely.  
Further, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a) explore the conditions under which political elites 
will block technological progress. They argue that it is not just the erosion of economic rents 
for elites that motivates their resistance to technological progress, but the threat of losing 
political power. In their view, the economically powerful cannot block new technologies if 
they do not have political power, whereas those who have political power and expect to 
remain powerful have no incentives to block progress. Only those who have political power 
and fear losing it have an interest in, and the means for, blocking technological advances. 
They  block  progress  in  an  eﬀort  to  reduce  uncertainty,  because  there  is  no  credible 
commitment to compensate those that lose power after a change of the economic structure. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a) apply this logic to the diﬀerent rates of industrialization in 
Britain and Germany versus Austria-Hungary and Russia. In Britain and Germany, landed 
interests anticipated continued political inﬂuence and did not oppose industrialization even 
though it would reduce their economic rents. In Austria-Hungary and Russia, on the contrary, 
the landed elites regarded railroads and industry as a threat to political power.  
To explore why elites extend the franchise and contribute to democratization even in the face 
of potentially losing power, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) formalize the trade-oﬀ between 
the threat of revolution and piecewise concessions of power. Franchise extension acts as a 
credible commitment towards future redistribution to the citizenry. The threat of social unrest 
depends on the degree of organization among the poor and a society‟s level of inequality. If 
the poor are too well organized, maybe contrary to intuition, they will be able to frequently 
pose  a  threat  of  revolution.  Hence,  they  are  powerful  enough  to  credibly  ensure  future 25 
 
redistribution to themselves. If the poor are well enough organized to pose a threat to the 
regime but not enough to do so continuously and the society is highly unequal, then social 
unrest is more likely and democratization becomes the only mechanism credibly guaranteeing 
future redistribution. At some levels of inequality, temporary distribution may momentarily 
stave oﬀ the threat of revolution. However, countries with continuously low inequality are 
slow to democratize, or will not become democratic at all, as the demand for redistribution is 
not high.  
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b), Germany, for example, met rising inequality 
and the threat of social unrest by expanding the welfare state supported by a large socialist 
party  ensuring  the  credibility  of  redistribution.  Only  the  shock  of  the  First  World  War 
increased inequality and created social unrest to a point that democratization was inevitable. 
Consequently,  Germany  exhibited  a  delayed  pattern  of  franchise  extension.  Britain,  in 
contrast, was continuously faced with the threat of revolution by the middle and lower classes 
and temporary redistribution was not a credible option. To maintain political power, the elites 
extended the franchise in multiple waves to the middle classes. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2000b) use these results and additional evidence from Britain, Germany, Sweden and France 
to give a new meaning to the Kuznets curve. Rising inequality is accompanied by the threat 
of revolution, which in many cases can only be met by extending the franchise in order to 
credibly assure future redistribution. In all four countries, there is some scant evidence that 
inequality  peaked  roughly  at  the  same  time  as  the  franchise  was  extended  and  declined 
thereafter.  
3.2.4   Modernization or critical junctures?  
In a classic work, Lipset (1959) argues that certain prerequisites are necessary for democracy 
to arise, such as higher levels of income, broad education, and a capitalist economy. He 
identiﬁes  income,  industrialization,  education  and  urbanization  as  highly  correlated  with 
democracy, but is cautious to not impose linear causality for any one factor but assumes 
multivariate causality (Lipset, 1959, p. 105). In the social sciences, modernization theory has 
many  facets.  Economists  often  associate  either  with  deterministic  stage-theories  of 
development (such as Rostow, 1959) or the simpliﬁed proposition that rising levels of income 
and/or education cause democratization.  
Acemoglu,  Johnson,  Robinson  and  Yared  (2007,  2008)  provide  cross-country  evidence 
challenging modernization theory and argue that their critical junctures approach is better 
suited as a theory of democratization and development. Motivated by a large body of research 
and statistical evidence since the 1960s linking democracy to income levels, Acemoglu et al. 
(2007, 2008) are interested in the direction of the causal relationship. In fact, modernization 
theory is diametrically opposed to their own theory, which holds that institutions (including 
democracy) cause development and not vice versa.  
Acemoglu et al. (2007, 2008) argue that previous studies
32 have based their conclusions on 
cross-sectional correlations only and do not establish causality. They present an extended 
                                                 
32 Examples of such studies are Barro (1999) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000). 26 
 
research design able to cope with serial correlation and reverse causality. To reduce serial 
correlation in their panel data ranging from 1960 to 2000, their estimates are not just based on 
annual,  but  also  ﬁve  year,  ten  year  and  twenty  year  intervals.  They  prefer  ﬁxed-eﬀects, 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982), and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators over 
simple pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators to reduce unobserved eﬀects and to 
better  approximate  the  true  relationship.  Further,  to  identify  the  causal  relationship  and 
endogenize income per capita, they construct two dynamic panel instruments (lagged savings 
rate and trade-weighted world income). They estimate the eﬀects of changes in income on 
changes  in  democracy  rather  than  drawing  conclusions  from  correlated  levels  only.  The 
rationale for this is strong, as any post-WWII sample is likely to estimate a high between-
country correlation of income and democracy. Today, most of the richest countries are also 
the most democratic. Fixed eﬀects estimators instead focus on within-country variation over 
time.  They  test  different  variations  of  the  following  specification  (with  and  without 
instruments):  
                                                        (16) 
  where      is the democracy score of country   in year  ,        is the first lag in the 
democracy score to capture mean reversion,        is the first lag of income,         is a vector 
of covariates,    is a set of time effects,    is a set of country effects, and      is the country-
time specific error term. Notation is in lower cases to represent first differences. 
Opposite to the results of earlier studies, Acemoglu et al. (2007) ﬁnd that there is no causal 
eﬀect  running from  income to  democracy.  In all cases,  they  ﬁrst report  the  pooled OLS 
estimates without ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on income,
33 corresponding with 
the  existing  paradigm  in  the  literature.  However,  when  controlling  for  ﬁxed  eﬀects,  the 
coeﬃcient on income becomes very small and insigniﬁcant. The Anderson-Hsiao and GMM 
estimates even change the direction of the relationship. With both democracy measures the 
eﬀect is negative, large, and insigniﬁcant in most of the speciﬁcations.  These results are 
robust  to  sample  changes  and  additional  controls  such  as  education,  which  enters 
insigniﬁcantly. The instrumental variables estimates using either the lagged savings rate or 
trade-weighted world income further corroborate that there is no causal eﬀect from income to 
democracy. Almost  all two-stage least  squares  or GMM estimates  with  either instrument 
result  in  a  negative  or  insigniﬁcant  coeﬃcient  on  lagged  income.  They  supplement  this 
analysis by investigating a 500-year sample with simple pooled OLS, while controlling for 
historical  factors  (such  as  log  population  density,  early  institutions  and  the  date  of 
independence).  Here  too,  their  most  comprehensive  speciﬁcation  is  able  to  remove  any 
signiﬁcant  remaining  partial  correlation  between  income  and  democracy.  Further,  in  the 
companion  paper,  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2007)  develop  a  double-hazard  model  of  democratic 
transition which also fails to establish an eﬀect of income on democracy.  
                                                 
33 Using the Freedom House measure of democracy the coeﬃcient of lagged income is 0.072 with a standard 
error of 0.010. Using the Polity measure of democracy the coeﬃcient lagged income is 0.053 with a standard 
error of 0.010. Both results refer to the ﬁve-year panel including the ﬁrst lag of democracy as an additional 
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3.2.5   Criticism and additional evidence  
The empirical and theoretical explorations of Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) attracted several 
criticisms directed both at their methodology and theory. In the following, we concentrate on 
the criticisms of the settler mortality data and instrumental variables method posed by Albouy 
(2004, 2006, 2008) and the criticism of theory and method by Glaeser et al. (2004). These 
two pointed out some of the most pressing issues in the Acemoglu et al. (2001) research and 
other studies using similar techniques or data, but are certainly not the only voices critical of 
their contribution (e.g. Przeworski, 2004a,b).  
Albouy (2004) seriously questions the coding and construction of the settler mortality series. 
He argues the data lack “geographical relevance, statistical precision, or comparability across 
countries” Albouy (2004, p. 2). Geographical relevance refers to the fact that Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) imputed mortality rates for missing observations based on data from other neighboring 
countries. Out of the 64 countries present in the original sample in Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
only  36  have  unique  and  distinct  mortality  rates  which  originated  in  their  geographical 
region. According to Albouy (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2001) use inconsistent and statistically 
imprecise rules in selecting mortality rates, particularly in terms of time (ﬁrst or later rate), 
unit (soldiers, bishops, or laborers) and weighting of multiple data points. He argues that the 
mortality rates are also not comparable across countries, as Acemoglu et al. (2001) mix rates 
from European soldiers on military campaigns with rates of soldiers in barracks. For Albouy 
(2004),  peace  in  the  19th  century  is  positively  correlated  with  income  levels  and  the 
confounding of these two rates makes settler mortality endogenous to the speciﬁcation.  
Albouy (2004) constructs two alternative series based either on soldiers in barracks or on 
campaign, and compares the original Acemoglu et al. (2001) model with his data. The ﬁrst 
stage signiﬁcance of his adjusted settler mortality instrument is much lower than the original, 
leading to the “weak instrument” problem.
34 Using clustered AR standard errors (Anderson 
and Rubin, 1949) rather than traditional standard errors, he shows that once the weak 
instrument  problem  is  accounted  for,  the  conﬁdence  intervals  on  the  estimated  eﬀect  of 
institutions  become  unreasonably  large  and  often  include  zero,  negative  inﬁnity  and/or 
positive inﬁnity in many speciﬁcations. He also shows that when using the original data 
series with additional controls such as continent dummies and latitude, or mean temperature 
and minimum rainfall, the ﬁrst stage relationship becomes insigniﬁcant and the second-stage 
AR conﬁdence interval unbounded. Albouy (2004) concludes that while the theory may be 
credible, the empirical eﬀect of institutions cannot be substantiated with the current settler 
mortality series.  
The  criticism  of  Albouy  (2004)  resulted  in  two  rebuttals  by  Acemoglu,  Johnson  and 
Robinson (2005, 2006) and further investigations by Albouy (2006, 2008). Acemoglu et al. 
(2005, 2006) maintain in a point-by-point discussion of Albouy‟s modiﬁcations that their 
coding  was  not  unreasonable  or  inconsistent  and  present  new  evidence  supporting  the 
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not able to isolate substantial exogenous variation in the instrumented variable, then the estimator will be biased 
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mortality rates they used. Much of the dispute concerns the assignment of mortality rates to 
countries in Africa and Latin America. To circumvent the issue of assignments, Acemoglu et 
al.  (2005,  2006)  emphasize  that  their  results  become  even  stronger  when  excluding  all 
African  observations.  However,  Albouy  (2008)  responds  that  this  statement  is  then  only 
based  on  11  unique  observations.  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2005,  2006)  argue  that  Albouy‟s 
distinction between soldiers in barracks or campaigns is not helpful, as it mixes very small 
campaigns and large warfare in the same variable. Instead, they argue that their approach of 
selecting  the  ﬁrst  available  peacetime  mortality  rate  has  been  applied  consistently.  They 
dismiss many of the modiﬁcations done by Albouy on the basis that he is selecting later 
mortality rates which are lower due to improvements in medicine and are not relevant proxies 
for early potential settler mortality.  Further, Acemoglu  et  al.  (2006) argue that Albouy‟s 
alterations imply that Africa was a healthier place for Europeans than much of Europe. To 
underline this point, Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2006) modify Albouy‟s data and show that with 
a few – in their view necessary – corrections, all of their original results are restored or even 
ampliﬁed. The debate focuses on many more individual coding issues which will not be 
discussed here; neither do we aim to adjudicate between the two positions.  
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) criticize three methodological and 
conceptual issues in the research of Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). First, they argue that all of 
the dominant indicators of institutions used in the literature are outcome measures and do not 
truly  reﬂect “deep” institutional  constraints.  Second, they show that settler mortality  and 
population  density  are  highly  correlated  with  other  factors  aﬀecting  GDP  today,  such  as 
education  or  the  disease  environment,  which  in  their  view  invalidates  their  use  as 
instruments. They suggest that the settlers might have not brought only their institutions, but 
more fundamentally their higher levels of human capital. Third, they show panel evidence 
suggesting  that  lagged  education  predicts  better  institutions  and  conclude  that  the 
modernization hypothesis is a better reﬂection of reality.  
The  validity  of  the  indicators  used  for  identiﬁcation  is  often  a  priori  assumed  and  not 
addressed further in the empirical literature. Glaeser et al. (2004) regard this as problematic 
and show that the standard indicators (risk of expropriation, government eﬀectiveness, and 
constraints on the executive) are only weakly correlated with more structural legal indicators, 
such as judicial independence, plurality, and proportional legislation. Instead, these indicators 
are mostly based on subjective assessments, exhibit high volatility, and reﬂect short-term 
electoral outcomes rather that deep institutional structures. In their view, if these indicators 
measure short-term outcomes, they cannot be used for causal inference in any study of long-
term  growth,  as  they  do  not  reﬂect  structural  features  but  merely  perceptions  that  are 
positively correlated with GDP levels.  
The problem of instrument validity is a common cause for debate in all studies using an 
instrumental variables approach. As the exclusion restriction is not directly testable,
35 the 
                                                 
35 Adopting an indirect least squares (ILS) representation similar to that in Albouy (2008), the implied system is: 
(1)                      ,  and  (2)                     .  We  can  solve  and  replace  (1)  by  its  reduced  form: 
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theoretical argument about their validity is decisive. Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest that the 
instruments are systematically correlated to other factors aﬀecting development outcome.
36 If 
the “neo-Europes” are richer today due to higher aggregate human capital of the colonial 
settlers, then low settler mortality is associated with high human capital today, invalidating 
the  exclusion  restriction  for  instrumental  variables.  They  also  examine  the  correlations 
between setter mortality (and log population density) and their structural legal indicators, 
which is weak.  
Interestingly, their third criticism, which argues that education predicts better institutions, 
also elicited a direct reply by Acemoglu et al. (2005). In their response, Acemoglu et al. 
(2005)  show  that  in  the  original  panel  regressions  of  Glaeser  et  al.  (2004)  the  eﬀect  of 
education becomes insigniﬁcant, small and negative, once time ﬁxed-eﬀects are included. In 
their view, this is due to other omitted factors driving the relationship in the speciﬁcation 
without time eﬀects, which falsely led Glaeser et al. (2004) to conclude that there is an eﬀect. 
In fact, this false conclusion just reﬂects a general upward trend in the country scores on the 
institutions indicators and increases in school enrolment occurring over the recent decades. 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) interpret the results of their re-speciﬁcation as a conﬁrmation of their 
critical junctures hypothesis.  
These criticisms raise two important and generalizable points which the subsequent empirical 
literature on institutions and growth needs to address. First, new instrumental variables need 
to  be  demonstrated  as  robust,  valid,  and  relevant,  as  well  as  motivated  by  a  detailed 
description on how the underlying data was constructed. Second, the indicators used to proxy 
for certain institutional characteristics need to be discussed and ﬁrmly established to actually 
measure the underlying theoretical construct being examined.  
3.3   Long-run to short-run growth  
The research of Rodrik and coauthors bridges the gap between long-run studies of growth and 
a policy-relevant discussion of contemporary growth. He has written on the determinants of 
long-run growth (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004), growth collapses (Rodrik, 1999), 
growth  accelerations  (Hausmann,  Pritchett  and  Rodrik,  2005)  and  developed  a  growth 
diagnostics framework (Rodrik, 2005; Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2005; Rodrik, 2010) 
for  identifying  country  speciﬁc  “binding-constraints”.  In  the  following,  we  review  these 
contributions  and  attempt  to  extract  a  framework  linking  the  determinants  of  long-term, 
medium-term and short-term growth.  
3.3.1   Long-run growth  
Similar  to  our  diﬀerentiation  between  proximate,  intermediate  and  ultimate  sources  of 
growth, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) argue that “growth theory has traditionally 
focused  on  physical  and  human  capital  accumulation,  and  in  its  endogenous  variant,  on 
technological  change.  But  accumulation  and  technological  change  are  at  best  proximate 
causes of economic growth” (emphasis added, pp. 132-133). They identify three competing 
                                                                                                                                                        
construction and              only by assumption. 
36 This point was ﬁrst raised in Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (2003).  30 
 
hypothesis of the determinants of long-run growth which have been put forth in the literature: 
geography (e.g. Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2001), international trade or economic integration 
(e.g Frankel and Romer, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 1995), and institutions (e.g. North, 1990; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002).  
Rodrik et al. (2004) investigate the causal relationships hypothesized by these theories and 
assess  the  relative  importance  of  each  respective  factor.  In  all  theories  there  are  causal 
interdependencies,  such  as  intensive  trade  requiring  certain  institutional  prerequisites,  or 
higher  income  levels  leading  to  both  higher  trade  volumes  and  (positively)  changed 
institutions. However, each of these theories does claim to identify the main cause of long-
run development. To ﬁnd the most pertinent causal mechanism, Rodrik et al. (2004) use 
instrumental variables for all endogenous regressors and show that the quality of institutions 
matters considerably more than the direct eﬀects of trade or geography. Their identiﬁcation 
strategy builds on two, then recent, innovations in the literature. First, using the approach of 
Acemoglu et al.  (2001), they instrument  for the quality of (legal) institutions today with 
settler mortality during colonization. Second, as suggested by Frankel and Romer (1999), 
actual international trade (imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP is instrumented with 
the results of a gravity equation predicting bilateral trade ﬂows.
37 Geography is exogenous.  
In their model, institutions are indirectly linearly dependent on geography and trade, and 
trade is dependent on institutions and geography. They test their main equation of interest 
(17), by endogenizing the quality of institutions with equation (18) and a country‟s trade 
integration with equation (19):  
                                    (17) 
                                         (18) 
                                         (19) 
  where    is the log of GDP per capita,    is a measure of institutions (namely, rule of 
law),    is the trade share of GDP,    the measure of geography (distance to the equator),    
is  log  settler  mortality,  and      is  the  constructed  trade  share  (from  the  gravity  equation 
estimates of Frankel and Romer, 1999). The exclusion restrictions are that    and    do not 
independently enter equation (17). 
Rodrik et al. (2004) report the results for three samples sizes. The ﬁrst sample consists of 64 
countries, as in the original Acemoglu et al. (2001) study and uses settler mortality as an 
instrument for institutions. The second sample is an extended version of the ﬁrst, consisting 
of  79  countries  and  incorporating  newer  settler  mortality  data.  The  third  sample  of  134 
countries uses the fraction of population speaking English and the fraction of the population 
                                                 
37 Frankel and Romer (1999) construct trade ﬂows by extending the following empirical model of bilateral trade 
with  many  more  geographic  variables:                                                    ,  where        is  the 
bilateral trade between countries   and   (exports plus imports),      is the physical distance between the two 
countries, and    and    are measures of country size. Frankel and Romer (1999) drop observations where no 
bilateral trade is recorded, which is also a challenge to theoretical models of international trade in general. 
Recently, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) developed a theoretical model and a corresponding two-step 
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speaking other European languages (from Hall and Jones, 1999) as alternative instruments for 
institutions. In all cases, institutions are approximated by an indicator assessing the strength 
of the “rule of law” (from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 2002) and geography is 
measured as distance to the equator. Rodrik et al. (2004) prefer the second sample, as they 
consider the Acemoglu et al. (2001) instrument more theoretically plausible (than using the 
linguistic  measures)  and  the  linguistic  instruments  in  the  third  sample  do  pass  the  over-
identifying restrictions.
38 
Their key result is that “the quality of institutions trumps everything else” (Rodrik et al., 
2004, p. 135). In all samples, the speciﬁcation, which includes the endogenously determined 
variables  and  the  exogenous  geography  measure,  yields  insigniﬁcant  and  negative 
coeﬃcients for the direct eﬀects of trade and geography, but highly signiﬁcant and very large 
coeﬃcients  for  the  direct  eﬀects  of  institutions.  They  also  calculate  the  total  impact  by 
combining the direct eﬀects and indirect eﬀects from additional regressions modeling the 
linear dependencies. To estimate the entire system of simultaneous eﬀects (apart from the 
feedback  eﬀects  from  income),  they  specify  two  additional  instrumental  variables 
regressions. Here, we show only the reduced form of relationships between institutions, trade 
and geography, and between trade, institutions and geography, respectively:  
                            
   (20) 
                            
   (21) 
To estimate the total eﬀect of each variable, they separately apply a unit shock to the error 
terms of the trade and institutions equations.
39 A unit shock to the institutions equation has a 
total eﬀect of 1.85 on log incomes, which would create a 5-fold diﬀerence in dollar incomes. 
A similar shock to the trade equation has a total eﬀect on log income of 0.09. The eﬀect of 
institutions is thus more than 20 times higher than that of trade. When considering only 
signiﬁcant  coeﬃcients,  then  the  instrumental  variables  estimate  of  the  direct  eﬀect  of 
institutions is equal to the total eﬀect of institutions, which is 198 log points – a more than 6-
fold increase in per capita income. The eﬀect of geography remains large with a total eﬀect 
on income of 149 log points. However, this eﬀect is driven by the large indirect inﬂuence that 
geography has on institutions. They also estimate the same speciﬁcations using income per 
worker,  capital  per  worker,  human  capital  per  worker  and  total  factor  productivity  as 
dependent  variables  (from  Hall  and  Jones,  1999).  In  each  case,  institutions  have  a  large 
positive  eﬀect  which  is  signiﬁcant  at  the  99%  level  or  higher,  while  in  most  cases  the 
coeﬃcients on international trade and geography are insigniﬁcant or just signiﬁcant, negative 
and  comparatively  small.  In  sum,  Rodrik  et  al.  (2004)  ﬁnd  that  trade  integration  has  a 
negligible  inﬂuence  on  incomes,  geography  mainly  aﬀects  incomes  indirectly  through 
                                                 
38 If there is more than one instrument for one endogenous regressor, the model is over-identiﬁed. A test of over-
identifying restrictions (e.g. Sargan test) tests that the residuals from an IV speciﬁcation are uncorrelated with a 
set of exogenous instruments. However, these tests are widely known to have low power.  
39 Here, the term shock simply refers to a change and not shock as understood in growth terms. They actually 
solve the implied system of simultaneous equatio ns (of standardized variables) and recover the parameters for 
each speciﬁed interrelationship. Then they calculate the eﬀects of changing one variable, ceteris paribus, which 
is equivalent to “shocking” that equation‟s error term.  32 
 
institutions, and the quality of institutions has both the largest direct and total eﬀects on per 
capita incomes.  
Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that instrumentation strategies should not be confused with theory 
building and testing, referring particularly to the contribution of Acemoglu et al. (2001) on 
which their research builds. For Rodrik et al. (2004), the proposition that colonialism was a 
key determinant of the modern between-country income distribution cannot account for the 
similar spread of incomes in countries that were never colonized. They illustrate this point by 
reporting the standard deviation of log incomes in former colonies (1.01) and non-colonies 
(0.89). Further, they argue that although Acemoglu et al. (2001) have identiﬁed a successful 
and valid instrumentation strategy, this does not require settler mortality to play a large role 
in  the  causal  relationship.  They  underline  this  argument  with  an  analogy.  Angrist  and 
Krueger (1991) identiﬁed when a person is born within a year (i.e. the quarter of birth) as a 
possible  instrument  for  estimating  the  eﬀect  of  schooling  on  earnings.  They  show  that 
because compulsory schooling goes from age 6 to 16 exactly, children born early in a year 
have the opportunity to drop out with less schooling than those born later in the year. Using 
this source of exogenous variation they can recover a consistent estimate of the returns to 
schooling. However, this strategy does not amount to a quarter of birth related theory of 
earnings or a direct test of such a theory. Similarly, according to Rodrik et al. (2004), the 
Acemoglu  et  al.  (2001)  strategy  does  not  directly  test  a  theory  of  colonial  origins  of 
development.  
3.3.2   The long-run model  
Following Rodrik et al. (2004), the long-run model can be summarized as shown in Figure 7 
below. They concentrate on “deep” determinants of growth or, in our terms, ultimate sources 
of growth, and allow for interrelationships between all endogenous variables. Institutions 
aﬀect  the  income  level  and  higher  levels  of  income  aﬀect  national  institutions.  Trade 
integration (nominal trade over nominal GDP) can directly aﬀect income and higher income 
can result in more trade integration. Trade also aﬀects institutions, for example by demanding 
greater organizational capacity or safety nets as compensation for increasing openness (see 
Rodrik,  1998b),  and  better  institutions  can  aid  in  deepening  economic  integration.  Only 
geography is entirely exogenous and potentially inﬂuences institutions (e.g. through tropical 
diseases), economic integration (e.g. through proximity to trading partners) and the income 
level (e.g. directly by determining underdevelopment in the tropics).  
Figure 7: The “deep” determinants of growth  
 
Source: Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).  33 
 
The  one-way  and  two-way  arrows  above  represent  all  possible  relationships  among  the 
elements in their multivariate framework. The theory behind these directions comes from the 
previously cited literature and this model must rather be interpreted as a metamodel in which 
all these theories ﬁt, rather than an original theory on its own. For example, a simpliﬁed 
version of modernization theory is represented in the feedback channel from income level to 
institutions,  although  Rodrik  et  al.  (2004)  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  opposite 
relationship. They show instrumental variables estimates of all of the interrelationships apart 
from  the  income  to  institutions  and  income  to  trade  feedback  channels  (for  lack  of  an 
instrument for income). Summarizing the results, they ﬁnd that institutions have by far the 
largest eﬀect on long-run growth, trade integration has no direct eﬀect, and geography exerts 
only a strong indirect inﬂuence on income through institutions and to a much lesser extent 
through  trade  integration.  Trade  does  not  exert  any  eﬀect  on  institutions,  but  better 
institutions feedback positively to economic openness. Hence, Rodrik et al. (2004) stress that 
causality mainly runs from institutions to income and that there is a strong indirect eﬀect of 
geography on income via institutions, while all other relationships matter less.  
Rigobon  and  Rodrik  (2005)  test  a  very  similar  model  which  allows  for  reverse 
interrelationships among all included variables. The main diﬀerence to the previous model is 
that institutions are split into rule of law and democracy, rather than just one proxy.
40 
Further, 
instead of using IVs, they employ a novel identiﬁcation through heteroscedasticity method 
pioneered by Rigobon (2003). Overall, the results are very similar to Rodrik et al. (2004). 
Both institutional measures positively predict income, but the eﬀect of rule of law is much 
more signiﬁcant than democracy, both economically and statistically. Openness has negative 
eﬀects  on  income  and  greater  distance  from  the  equator  (geography)  positively  aﬀects 
income, democracy and institutions. The main addition of this research to Rodrik et al. (2004) 
is that the reverse eﬀects of income on institutions or trade are signiﬁcant but comparatively 
small, while democracy and rule of law are positively interdependent.  
3.3.3   Growth collapses, external shocks, and growth accelerations  
Much of the research present so far has concentrated on diﬀerences in contemporary levels of 
GDP per capita, which is academically relevant but of limited use for current policy aimed at 
stimulating and sustaining growth. To illustrate the diﬀerence, we can conceive of the level of 
GDP per capita and indicators of quality institutions as stock variables which consist of the 
cumulative sum of ﬂow variables, such as growth spurts or collapses and a multitude of 
policies/reforms  (Rodrik  et  al.,  2004).  Hence,  level  regressions  measure  the  cumulative 
impact of all historical growth-enhancing or growth-constraining policies. It is obvious that 
the theory and evidence of the determinants of long-term growth vis-à-vis short/medium term 
growth  yield  very  diﬀerent  insights.  According  to  Rodrik  et  al.  (2004),  the  policy 
implications of the long-run literature for short-run growth are non-existent or even harmful 
when  misinterpreted,  while  investigations  linking  growth  in  the  short  run  to  institutional 
characteristics  have  yet  to  produce  robust  and  relevant  results.  To  explore  the  roots  of 
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for example Kaufmann et al., 2002) and for democracy with the composite indicator from Polity IV (Marshall 
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contemporary  growth  further,  Rodrik  argues  that  we  should  distinguish  among  growth 
collapses, growth accelerations and sustained growth – recognizing that each of these can 
relate  diﬀerently  to  institutions  and  policies  (e.g.  Rodrik,  1999;  Rodrik  et  al.,  2004; 
Hausmann  et  al.,  2005).  We  review  the  evidence  in  favor  of  such  a  distinction  in  the 
following.  
In “Where did all the growth go?”, Rodrik (1999) focuses on explaining how average growth 
rates and total factor productivity growth rates in Latin America, the Middle East and East 
Asia were comparatively high until the mid-1970s, but collapsed in the ﬁrst two regions 
thereafter. He argues that the so-called East Asian miracle
41 
prior to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis 
of 1997-98 can be explained by the total  factor productivity declines  and dismal  growth 
performance  in  the  Middle  East  and  Latin  America  after  1973.  For  Rodrik  (1999),  the 
mystery is not the so-called miracle in East Asia, but the relative decline elsewhere.  
To  explain  the  growth  collapse,  Rodrik  (1999)  proposes  to  conceptualize  the  economic 
turbulence of the 1970s not as merely an eﬀect of external shocks
42 (changes in the terms of 
trade, wars, and the oil crisis) but as an interaction between external shocks, latent social 
conﬂict and conﬂict management institutions. Speciﬁcally, he understands social conﬂict as a 
coordination failure among social groups deciding on how to divide a shrinking (negative 
shock) or growing (positive shock) economic base. In his simple model, groups can either 
cooperate, which is equal to maintaining the initial distribution applied to the new resource 
base, or ﬁght, which is aimed at increasing their expected shares. In the latter strategy, latent 
social conﬂict turns into open conﬂict. Open conﬂict bears with it a cost to the economy and 
thus further reduces the resource base. Rodrik (1999) argues that the latter behavior arises 
especially  in  highly  polarized  or  ethnically  fragmented  societies  (high  conﬂict  potential), 
and/or when the returns to winning are high because the successful exclusion of competing 
parties is likely (weak conﬂict management institutions). Diﬀerences in growth performance 
are a function of total shocks experienced in the 1970s, which in turn can be heuristically 
expressed as:
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Rodrik (1999) operationalizes the dependent variable as the diﬀerential in per capita growth 
from 1975-1989 and per capita growth from 1960 to 1975. External shocks in the 1970s are 
measured by the standard deviation of the ﬁrst log-diﬀerences in the terms of trade from 1971 
to 1980 multiplied with the total share of trade in GDP from 1970 to 1974.
44 
Rodrik (1999) 
                                                 
41 The East Asian miracle was commonly thought to include rapid increases in productivity. This paradigm was 
popularly challenged by Krugman (1994), who, building on the work of Young (1994, 1995) and others, has 
argued that East Asia grew so rapidly mainly due to one-oﬀ increases in capital and labor inputs. In retrospect, 
strong growth in East Asia did not end with the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis; these economies have continued to 
grow after the crisis but on average slower than before.  
42 Here we mean shock in the sense of an abrupt and large change, and not a unit change as before.  
43 Essentially, this relationship is a summary of the results of a simple formal model provided in the working 
paper version of this article (Rodrik, 1998a).  
44 Interestingly, this is merely a measure of the change in  the terms of trade rather than a measure of terms of 
trade shocks. The term shock implies that the measure should capture large changes only.  35 
 
constructs  two  sets  of  conﬂict  and  institutions  measures.  His  preferred  set  is  the  Gini 
coeﬃcient of inequality (from Deininger and Squire, 1996) as an indicator of latent conﬂict 
and the ICRG composite indicator of the quality of government institutions (from Knack and 
Keefer, 1995) as an indicator of the quality of conﬂict institutions. An alternative set uses 
ethnolinguistic fragmentation (from Mauro, 1995) and a composite indicator of democracy 
(Freedom House). Rodrik (1999) first tests an additive linear specification, which can be 
generalized as follows:  
                                        (22) 
  where     is  the growth  differential  between two periods,     is  a measure  of external 
shocks,    is a measure of latent conflict,    is a measure of conflict management institutions 
and     is the transpose of a vector of covariates (including growth in the previous period, the 
log  of  GDP  at  the  break  year,  and  regional  dummies)  with  a  corresponding  vector  of 
coefficients  . 
Rodrik (1999) ﬁnds strong evidence conﬁrming the theory outlined before. All regressions of 
the growth diﬀerential  on the explanatory variables include regional dummies, growth of 
GDP per capita from 1960 to 1975, and the log of GDP per capita in 1975 to account for both 
the  eﬀect  of  convergence  or  mean  reversion.  Including  the  external  shocks  measure  in 
addition  yields  a  highly  signiﬁcant  coeﬃcient  of  -0.17.  When  inequality  is  added  to  the 
speciﬁcation its coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant and negative (-0.12), while the shock measure 
remains signiﬁcant. Interestingly, when the quality of government institutions is added to the 
regression, the coeﬃcients of external shocks and inequality become insigniﬁcant and close 
to zero. He interprets this as direct evidence of the prescriptions arising from his model, that 
is,  well-developed  social  conﬂict  management  institutions  ensure  that  the  distribution  of 
economic  resources  remains  free  of  opportunistic  behavior  by  certain  groups.  As  a 
consequence,  the  output  reducing  eﬀects  of  shocks  and  latent  conﬂict  become  virtually 
irrelevant. When using the alternative indicators but leaving the measure of trade shocks 
unaltered, ethnic fractionalization (conﬂict) and democracy (conﬂict management) are both 
signiﬁcant and very similar in magnitude but with opposite signs, which suggests that ethnic 
conﬂict matters even when controlling for the quality of institutions.  
In a second estimation, Rodrik (1999) uses the growth diﬀerential as before and the growth 
diﬀerential after the break year (from Pritchett, 1998) as dependent variables. The break year 
refers to the point of deviation from previous trend growth. Instead of including measures of 
shocks, conﬂict and institutions separately, Rodrik (1999) constructs composite measures of 
social conﬂict similar to the heuristic equation shown above. The modified model is more in 
line with the multiplicative effects proposed in his theory and can be represented as:  
                                        (23) 
  where notation is as before and we additionally assume all measures of institutions to be 
standardized between zero and one. 36 
 
The terms of trade variable remains his preferred measure of external shocks. He tests four 
combinations. The ﬁrst uses ethno-linguistic fragmentation and democracy, the second, the 
Gini  coeﬃcient  for  high  data  quality  countries  and  democracy,  the  third,  all  available 
inequality data and the ICRG institutions measure, and the fourth, the proportion of people 
not speaking the country‟s language at home and democracy. In all of the speciﬁcations, these 
measures have highly signiﬁcant, negative and large coeﬃcients (ranging from -0.77 to -
1.65).  The  results  indicate  that  a  one  standard  deviation  change  to  the  conﬂict  indicator 
corresponds to 0.75 to 1.65 percent lower growth per year relative to the growth performance 
before.  
As  latent  conﬂict  and  institutions  can  be  operationalized  in  many  ways,  Rodrik  (1999) 
extends this speciﬁcation with additional indicators, such as the murder rate, a measure of 
trust, racial tension, and social spending. Generally, the pattern and results remain robust to 
these  alternatives.  Interestingly,  when  further  expanding  the  speciﬁcations  to  include 
conventional  explanations  such  as  openness  to  trade,  debt  to  GDP,  import  tariﬀs,  and 
government consumption of GDP, their coeﬃcient are all insigniﬁcant. Rodrik (1999) also 
constructs an index of “bad policy” consisting of the inﬂation rate and black market premia 
for foreign currency after 1975. This index is strongly correlated with the growth diﬀerentials 
and,  in  turn,  all  of  his  social  conﬂict  measures  and  measures  of  conﬂict  management 
institutions  are  associated  with  the  index  in  the  expected  direction.  He  concludes  that 
participatory politics, democratic institutions, rule of law and social insurance all contribute 
to macroeconomic stability and resistance to external shocks.  
Hausmann,  Pritchett  and  Rodrik  (2005)  investigate  growth  accelerations  to  add  to  the 
evidence on growth collapses and growth diﬀerentials after the mid-1970s. They employ a 
novel approach compared to the previous literature, which has concentrated heavily on level 
regressions or panel data econometrics and mainly came to the conclusion that openness, 
sound  money  and  property  rights  matter.  Since  growth  is  highly  volatile  and  countries 
experience growth, stagnation or decline at dissimilar points in time, shifts in the underlying 
trend  for  each  country  can  be  more  informative  then  evidence  based  on  average  growth 
performance. Hausmann et al. (2005) argue that both neo-classical and endogenous growth 
theory evolve around the idea of shifting growth paths, comprised of accelerations to a new 
steady state in the former, or permanent growth accelerations in the latter. Their approach 
captures these shifts and allows for non-linear relationships, such as a country emerging from 
a poverty trap, while another remains stuck in a low-level equilibrium. Ultimately, it also 
links the research to policy relevant questions, such as: how is growth ignited and how is it 
sustained?  
Hausmann et al. (2005) deﬁne three conditions which identify growth accelerations. First, 
average growth during an acceleration episode must be rapid, that is greater or equal to 3.5% 
per  annum.  Second,  the  growth  rate  must  be  at  least  2%  per  annum  higher  than  in  the 
previous growth episode and, third, total output after the growth acceleration must exceed the 
pre-episode maximum level of output. An episode refers to eight years. These criteria are 
applied  as  forward-looking  and  backward-looking  comparisons,  where  the  eight  years 
subsequent  to  a break  year are compared with  the eight  years before,  and then the next 37 
 
possible break year is examined. The third criterion compares the level of output at the end of 
the growth acceleration with all the available years before the break year. These conditions 
are crucial as they serve to distinguish pure post-recession recoveries from actual changes 
towards  higher  trend  growth.  Countries  can  have  multiple  and  overlapping  growth 
accelerations,  as  long  as  these  are  ﬁve  years  apart.  Hausmann  et  al.  (2005)  use  spline 
regressions to identify the start of accelerations if there is more than one year as a candidate.
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They use data from the Penn World Tables from 1950 to 1999, hence the ﬁrst episode can 
begin in 1957 and the last in 1992.  
Table 2: Frequency of accelerated growth episodes  
   Region          
Decade   Asia   Africa   Middle 
East  Europe   Latin 
America  Other   Total   Eps.  Obs.  
1950s   11.11%  5.26%  22.22%  12.82%  3.77%  10.00%  8.78%  12  148 
1960s   6.12%  3.49%  5.26%  0.76%  2.78%  6.90%  3.44%  23  668 
1970s   3.36%  2.46%  6.06%  0.00%  2.81%  1.89%  2.49%  23  922 
1980s   5.30%  0.56%  1.12%  2.78%  0.97%  0.00%  1.62%  16  990 
1990s   3.13%  1.10%  0.00%  4.26%  5.45%  4.76%  2.96%  8  270 
                   
Total   4.90%  1.87%  4.08%  2.34%  2.53%  2.89%  2.77%  83  2998  
Eps.  18  20  10  12  17  6  83     
Obs.   429  965  245  513  673  173  2998      
Source: Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005). 
This  filter  results  in  83  growth  accelerations  which  includes  the  well-known  growth 
accelerations (e.g. countries in East Asia during the late 1980s and early 1990s, China in 
1978 or Brazil in 1967), but also 20 growth spurts in sub-Saharan Africa and 10 growth 
accelerations in the Middle East and North Africa. The magnitude of the average acceleration 
using their ﬁlter is very high. The median and average growth per annum is 4% and 4.7%, 
respectively. As a result, output was on average about 40% higher at the end of an episode 
than  before.  When  computing  the  unconditional  probability  of  acceleration  per  decade, 
Hausmann et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the results diﬀer strongly by decade and region (see Table 2 
above). However, the number of observations also varies by time and region. If early data 
availability is correlated with experiencing accelerations, then we must contend that these 
tabulations obviously exhibit an upward bias.  
For 69 of these 83 episodes, Hausmann et al. (2005) have data for the 8 years subsequent to 
the growth acceleration, which allows an assessment on whether this growth performance 
was  sustained  in  the  longer-term.  Interestingly,  23.2%  of  previous  accelerations  were 
followed by negative growth, 23.3% by slow growth (less than 2% per annum), and 53.6% by 
rapid growth. Of the identiﬁed episodes, African countries tended to have negative growth 
before and after growth accelerations, while Asian countries dominate the group of countries 
                                                 
45 Speciﬁcally, they select episodes by identifying the highest F-statistic from multiple spline regressions with 
the knot (or break) at the candidate year. Spline regression models allow for discontinuities in the underlying 
data, while the model F-statistic can be used to compare similar speciﬁcations.  38 
 
with high growth prior to and following growth accelerations. Naturally, all of these results 
strongly depend on the parameters used to identify accelerated growth episodes.
46 
Hausmann et al. (2005) examine the correlates of growth accelerations in various ways and 
ﬁnd that growth accelerations seem to be accompanied by more investment, more exports and 
a devaluation of the exchange rate. However, these correlations could merely capture the 
ﬁlter‟s inability to remove growth rebounds after macroeconomic crises. We concentrate on 
the results of their probit analysis here, as it represents their most elaborate attempt to identify 
structure in the data. Their dependent variable is a dummy variable taking on a value of unity 
for three years centered on the beginning of a growth acceleration, and zero otherwise. They 
include explanatory variables capturing favorable terms of trade, positive or negative changes 
in the Polity IV scores on regime change,
47 the death of an incumbent leader,
48 recent armed 
conﬂict or civil wars,
49 economic liberalization,
50 and ﬁnancial liberalization.
51 
Only a few of the variables emerge as consistently signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, negative regime 
changes have a positive impact on igniting growth, while positive regime changes remain 
insigniﬁcant throughout. Favorable terms of trade help to ignite a growth spurt and incumbent 
leaders that die in oﬃce while only holding a short tenure negatively aﬀect growth. Financial 
liberalization is highly signiﬁcant and has the largest coeﬃcient of all the estimated variables. 
Economic  liberalization  is  mostly  insigniﬁcant,  just  as  wars  and  civil  wars  do  not  have 
distinguishable eﬀects on growth. In general, all of these speciﬁcations have low explanatory 
power and do not explain more than 8% of the variance. They compare these results to those 
of  alternative  estimation  methods  using  probit  regression  with  country-clustered  standard 
errors, censored tobit regression, modiﬁed logit regressions to cope with rare-occurrence bias, 
random-eﬀects probit, and a linear probability model (LPM). In all cases, the results remain 
remarkably similar in terms of signiﬁcance and magnitude.  
A  puzzling  result  is  why  changes  towards  autocracy  should  positively  predict  growth 
accelerations, while changes towards democracy have a negligible eﬀect. Likewise, economic 
liberalization  does  not  matter  much,  while  ﬁnancial  liberalization  does.  Hausmann  et  al. 
(2005) argue that this result can only be understood if we further diﬀerentiate between growth 
acceleration and sustained growth. To corroborate this point, they re-estimate the previous 
speciﬁcations  but  diﬀerentiate  the  dependent  variable  into  a  sustained  and  unsustained 
growth. Sustained growth is deﬁned as growth in excess of 2% per annum in the ten years 
                                                 
46 For example, taking a 5-year horizon results in 137 growth episodes and taking a 10-year horizon results in 
just 37 episodes. If the rapid growth threshold is raised to 4% per annum, then 68 episodes are identiﬁed, and if 
it is lowered to 3%, then 90 episodes are identiﬁed.  
47 From Marshall and Jaggers (2003). Regime change is deﬁned as a 3 unit change in the underlying Polity IV 
score.  The  variables  are  coded  unity  for  a  total  of  ﬁve  years  following  a  move  to  greater  democracy  or 
authoritarianism.  
48 A dummy variable with a ﬁve-year unity value beginning with an incumbent leader‟s death.  
49 Defined as unity over ﬁve years since the end of a civil war, otherwise zero. Similarly, a separate dummy 
variable is deﬁned for armed conﬂicts in general.  
50 Capturing a transition to openness similarly to Sachs and Warner (1995) , which is also deﬁned as a ﬁve year 
dummy.  
51 A ﬁve year dummy from the date ﬁnancial liberalization occurred with the starting date from the working 
paper version of Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005).  39 
 
after the acceleration episode (8 + 10 = 18 years in total) and growth falling below 2% per 
annum in the same time horizon is categorized as unsustained. The results diverge sharply. 
Terms of trade shocks are only signiﬁcant for unsustained growth, economic liberalization is 
strongly  associated  with  sustained  growth,  positive  regime  changes  are  signiﬁcant  for 
sustained  but  not  unsustained  episodes,  negative  regime  changes  remain  signiﬁcant  and 
positive  throughout,  and  ﬁnancial  liberalization  is  only  related  to  unsustained  growth 
episodes.  
Many  of  the  above  results  are  more  intuitive.  Terms  of  trade  shocks  and  ﬁnancial 
liberalization strengthen exports or increase foreign capital/domestic returns, but are highly 
volatile. Economic liberalization, if understood as deep structural reform, seems a precursor 
of sustained growth and not linked to immediate growth changes. Positive regime changes 
now  matter  for  medium-term  growth  which  could  be  related  to  broader  participation  in 
economic opportunities. However, moves to  autocracy still positively  predict  growth  and 
oﬀset the eﬀect of positive changes. Hausmann et al. (2005) do not attempt to conceptualize 
this speciﬁc result, although it can be can be interpreted as indicating that autocratic leaders 
often establish temporary stability in unstable nation states, which in turn creates enough 
security for short and medium term growth takeoﬀs. As long run studies suggest the opposite, 
this is an indication of the non-linear relationships between growth performance, time and 
regime types. Hausmann et al. (2005) conclude that the determinants of growth accelerations 
are  not  well-identiﬁed  in  these  speciﬁcations,  as  they  too  often  incorrectly  predict  the 
outcome.  
They  point  to  two  main  results  that  emerge  from  this  research.  First,  igniting  growth  is 
relatively easy as seen in the rather large number of strong growth spurts. Second, these 
accelerations are not preceded or well-predicted by changes in political structures, economic 
reforms or other institutional changes and appear rather to be driven by idiosyncratic factors. 
We explore the concepts of accelerations in the short and medium-term further by focusing 
on  Rodrik‟s  growth  diagnostics  framework,  which  focuses  on  country-speciﬁc  “binding 
constraints”, and by subsequently presenting a provisional framework uniting the evidence 
from the preceding sections.  
3.3.4   Binding constraints and growth diagnostics  
For Rodrik (2005, 2008, 2010) the lack of variables that can be robustly linked to growth 
accelerations  on  average  is  not  very  surprising.  The  plethora  of  growth  models  of 
contemporary  growth  are  evidence  of  the  diverse  factors  that  bring  about  modern 
development. Various growth models hold reliable prescriptions, however, each variant only 
holds under strictly deﬁned conditions. In other words, “Raul Prebisch, Anna Krueger, and 
Jeﬀrey Sachs are all correct – at diﬀerent times and under speciﬁc circumstances” (Rodrik, 
2010, p. 35). This view especially evolved after the unsatisfactory results of the Washington 
consensus, which reduced the vector of possible growth strategies to a clearly deﬁned list of 
quintessential reform strategies, applicable everywhere, to be undertaken as fast as possible, 
and without much consideration for the country context. The emerging long-term growth 
literature and advances  in endogenous growth models both contributed to the intellectual 
dismissal of the consensus and the tacit admission of a much more complex reality. This gave 40 
 
rise to a larger literature on policy reform in a second-best context rather than in ideal type 
situations.  
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005, 2008) provide a meta-framework of growth policy 
analysis and strategies for igniting growth in the short-run. Their key idea is that in a second-
best economy, which is virtually the reality everywhere, there is an interplay between any 
speciﬁc distortion and all other distortions. In any reform scenario, not only the direct impact 
of reducing or removing the targeted distortion must be considered but also the changing 
interrelationships  with  all other distortions.  Among this  universe of distortions,  there  are 
certain “binding constraints”, i.e. those with the most profound growth debilitating eﬀects 
which  ought  to  be  targeted  ﬁrst.  They  present  a  stylized  model  for  conducting  “growth 
diagnostics” (the activity of identifying binding constraints) which, following Hausmann et 
al. (2005, 2008) can be formally summarized as follows:  
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  where   is the welfare of an average member of the economy,    or    is the tax-wedge or 
distortion on activity   or   with        ,    or    is the direct cost/benefit of distortion   or  , 
  
         is the social value of activity   after all taxes and all distortions, and   
         is 
the corresponding private valuation. 
The framework captures the simple idea of intertwined and differently sized distortions while 
remaining suitable to incorporate almost any growth model. For example, inadequacies of 
certain  institutions  linked  to  any  activity  could  be  considered  part  of  the  distortion  or  a 
separate condition driving the wedge between private and social valuations. We can break 
down equation (24) into three distinct parts. The outcome is simply the change in welfare of 
the average member given a change in the distortion  . The first term is the direct change in 
welfare of altering the distortion of activity  , i.e. a reduction increases welfare. The second 
term,  however,  is  the  cumulative  interaction  effect  of  changing  the  distortion     with  the 
distortions on all other activities. In other words, the weighted sum of gaps in private and 
social valuations given a change in distortion  . 
The implications are obvious. If the effect of the second term is larger than the first, it is 
possible that the interaction effects completely offset the welfare gain from the (distortion 
reducing) reform or even lead to a net welfare loss. Likewise, it is easy to see that ideal-type 
reforms only consider    and ignore the cumulative or second-best effect of the summation 
over   's. So what are binding constraints? Essentially nothing else than very large direct 
effects (  's) which according to Hausmann et al. (2005, 2008) also implies that the indirect 
eﬀects might not outweigh a reduction in the constraint. They evaluate the merits of ﬁve 
stylized approaches to reform, including their own:  
(1)  “Wholesale Reform”: ideally desirable, but nearly impossible to carry out, as it requires 
perfect knowledge of all distortions and perfect execution.  
(2)  “As much as you can”: a potentially dangerous policy that can be welfare decreasing 
when the second-best eﬀects are neglected.  41 
 
(3)  “Second-best reform”: ideal piecewise approach, but not feasible as it requires the perfect 
knowledge of all interaction eﬀects.  
(4)  “Target largest distortions (  )”: largest wedge is not necessarily largest problem for 
growth and it requires the knowledge of all distortions (arising from market and 
government failures).  
(5)  “Binding constraints”: feasible, eliminate the distortions with largest ﬁrst-order welfare 
increasing eﬀects than assumed second-order welfare decreasing interaction eﬀects.  
 
There is considerable uncertainty inherent in all of these reform strategies, but the essential 
argument of Hausmann et al. (2005, 2008) is that the binding constraints approach requires 
the least amount of information, which can in most instances be estimated or guessed rather 
than perfectly rank-ordered, and this approach to reform has a smaller potential of harming 
rather than improving the situation. However, this assertion is not entirely obvious, since 
second-order eﬀects are hard to estimate in any real world scenario and if misjudged can 
nullify or reverse any attempt at reform no matter what the strategy. Hausmann et al. (2005, 
2008) further acknowledge that direct identiﬁcation of the most directly welfare improving 
reform is not possible either and suggest instead to systematically analyze the proximate 
determinants of growth, ﬁnd underperforming variables and their associated distortions. This 
approach,  which  they  call  “growth  diagnostics”,  can  be  summarized  in  a  decision  tree 
beginning with the determinants of a balanced growth path in standard neoclassical analysis 
(Figure 8 below).  
The  stepwise  approach  follows  from  evaluating  the  components  of  the  balanced-growth 
equilibrium and at each step questioning which variables aﬀect their performance. We can 
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  where   is consumption,   is capital,   is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption,   is 
the return on capital,   is the tax on capital (formal/informal), and   is the world interest rate. 
Further,   depends on total factor productivity     , an index of externalities     and the 
availability of complementary factors of production    .  
Two terms are essential for growth diagnostics: (1)         , which is the private return to 
domestic  investments,  and  (2)   ,  which  is  the  cost  of  finance.  High  cost  of  financing 
domestic investments might be due to a high international assessment of country risks, a high 
regulatory  burden  or  unattractive  FDI  positions,  among  others.  Likewise,  local  capital 
markets may be underdeveloped and exhibit increased volatility, which in turn is negatively 
assessed in international capital markets. If private returns are low, this might be due to low 
social returns or low appropriability. These are essentially defined by four variables: (1) high 
   –  high taxes,  inefficient  tax systems,  or high risk  of expropriation, (2) high    – large 
externalities, coordination failures and spillover effects, (3) low   – low productivity, low 
level  of  technology,  etc.,  and  (4)  low     –  low  human  capital  stock,  underdeveloped 42 
 
infrastructure, and transport costs in the wider sense. The sub-nodes of the decision tree 
represent a number of factors that influence these four variables. 
Figure 8: Growth diagnostics 
 
Source: Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2008).  
The  framework  succeeds  in  combining  many  macroeconomic  and  microeconomic 
interactions,  while  hierarchically  organizing  the  basic  conclusions  of  a  large  amount  of 
modern  economic  theory  on  factor  accumulation,  learning  and  spillovers,  externalities, 
institutions, ﬁnancial markets, taxation, and government or market failures, and more. We 
present it here mainly with the purpose of showing that proximate sources of growth, which 
determine  growth  outcomes  in  the  medium-term  and  short-run,  depend  on  many  more 
variables than just factor accumulation often going beyond what evidence from cross-country 
regressions can reveal. In a broader sense, the research of Rodrik and collaborating authors 
make  clear  that  for  growth  theory,  evidence  and  policy  analysis  the  time-frame  matters 
crucially for the results the research will produce and determines their relevance to policy-
making.  
3.3.5   A uniﬁed framework?  
Figure 9 is a schematic representation capturing most of the evidence and theory examined in 
the preceding sections on Rodrik‟s research. We distinguish between long-run growth paths 43 
 
and  growth  in  the  medium/short-term.  Long-run  growth  paths  are  to  some  extent 
deterministically  inﬂuenced  geographic  conditions  and  their  eﬀects  on  the  quality  of 
institutions, but also by a country‟s ability to build institutions that protect property rights, 
allow for participatory politics, and create a strong rule of law. In contrast, growth in the 
medium-term and short-term depends on many traditional factors identiﬁed by neoclassical 
economics,  such  as  factor  accumulation,  but  also  modern  institutions,  external  shocks, 
conﬂicts, and growth policy in the broadest sense. For simplicity of illustration, we omit 
possible  feedback  paths  (for  example,  back  from  the  diverging  growth  performances  to 
medium-term and long-term factors).  
Figure 9: From long-run to short-term growth  
 
Source: authors‟ illustration. 
First, the interplay between long-term factors has been well-established by the work reviewed 
earlier  and  in  Rodrik  et  al.  (2004).  Institutions  are  the  most  crucial  of  the  long-run 
determinants.  In  fact,  changing  institutions  in  a  positive  manner  can  overcome  the 
deterministic inﬂuence  of  geography, increase trade volumes and  even capture positively 
reinforcing  eﬀects  running  back  from  income  levels.  More  interestingly,  these  long-run 
development  paths  in  part  determine  the  current  state  of  institutions,  technology 
(productivity), accumulated human and physical capital, and to a lesser extent the degree of 
latent social conﬂict.  
Second, for the medium and short-term, we combine all the major insights of Rodrik (1999), 
Hausmann et al. (2005), and Hausmann et al. (2008). Factor endowments (such as physical 
and human capital) matter just as much as “binding constraints”, which restrict the productive 
potential and link the factors endowments with the components of the growth diagnostics 
framework. Hausmann et al. (2005) have shown that is easy to ignite growth, which can 
happen through policy changes, changes in factor proportions, institutional changes and many 
idiosyncratic factors that cannot be captured by estimating cross-country averages. However, 
it is much harder to sustain growth. Rodrik (1999) has oﬀered explanations linking growth 
performance in the medium-term to latent social conﬂict and a country‟s capacity to mitigate 
the  eﬀects  of  external  shocks  and  the  resulting  distributive  ﬁghts  in  socially  fragmented 
environments  through  well-developed  conﬂict  management  institutions.  Hausmann  et  al. 
(2005)  convincingly  show  that  the  institutional  requirements  and  factors  determining 
sustained episodes are very diﬀerent from those aﬀecting accelerations. Moreover, the lack of 
robust  relationships  underlines  that  many  other  idiosyncratic  factors  drive  the  diﬀerent 
growth performances.  44 
 
Last,  Rodrik  (2000)  emphasizes  that  institutional  functions  does  not  directly  prescribe 
institutional forms. For example, he argues that although property rights are among the most 
fundamental  institutions  aﬀecting  growth,  they  must  not  necessarily  be  equivalent  to 
ownerships rights. Control rights might reduce the gap between social and private returns 
without  any  formal  transfer  of  ownership.  Many  more  examples  of  such  a  diversity  of 
successful but intrinsically diﬀerent institutional forms can be found.
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In sum, while the link of institutions to long-run level of per capita income is well-established 
(subject  to  some  econometric  objections  regarding  the  instrumentation  strategies),  the 
evidence linking growth to short and medium-term outcomes is much less robust. While 
some might interpret this lack of a strong relationship as merely an empirical obstacle, it is 
equally plausible that it is due to a multitude of very diﬀerent country-speciﬁc institutional 
and  non-institutional  factors  involved  in  igniting,  sustaining  and  collapsing  growth 
performances.  
4.  SYNTHESIS 
In this section, we place the ﬁndings of the literature in the sources-of-growth framework 
presented in the beginning of this paper. We use this framework to highlight the similarities 
and diﬀerences of the theories and variables examined. Figure 10 below presents a modiﬁed 
version of the framework including only the factors examined in this review of the literature. 
However, before we contrast the theories in terms of sources of growth and socio-economic 
outcomes, two remarks need to be made. First, some long-run factors, such as technology 
cycles  or  the  distance  to  the  technological  frontier,  have  not  been  discussed  by  the 
contributions reviewed in this paper but nevertheless remain relevant to modern economic 
growth (e.g. see Comin, Easterly and Gong, 2010). Second, theories referring to changes in 
culture and attitudes as drivers of long-run growth are not prominent in the recent debates, 
with  a few  exceptions.
53 
At best  they have been partially incorporated into  the incentive 
structures provided by institutions.  
 
                                                 
52 See Rodrik (2000) for a more detailed discussion. Rodrik (2000) deﬁnes ﬁve major institutional functions – 
namely, property rights, regulation (of market failures), macroeconomic stability, social security, and conﬂict 
management – and shows how in diﬀerent countries these functions are fulﬁlled by very diﬀerent institutions 
and/or institutional conﬁgurations.  
53 Clark (2007) is one of the few contemporary economists stressing the inﬂuence of culture together with 
technology and Malthusian dynamics on long-run growth. He argues there is the “popular misconception [that] 
the preindustrial world is of a cowering mass of peasants ruled by a small, violent, and stupid upper class that 
extracted from them all surplus beyond what was needed for subsistence and so gave no incentives for trade, 
investment, or improvement in technology” (Clark, 2007, pp. 145). This argument rests on showing how Britain 
in 1300 and other earlier civilizations had a system of incentives and suﬃciently stable rule of law in place. 
Clark (2007) focuses on simple and selective comparisons of macroeconomic indicators on prices, taxes, public 
debt and proxies for property rights. He downplays the role played by the transformation of political institutions 
occurring in the 18th and 19th centuries in igniting economic growth. Very recently, there has been a resurgent 
interest in the study of the economics of culture and some empirical studies do in fact ﬁnd eﬀects of culture on 
long-run growth, which stand to be more widely conﬁrmed (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Tabellini, 2010). 
Another exception is provided by Harrison (1985) and Harrison and Huntington (2000).  45 
 
Figure 10: Modiﬁed Sources-of-Growth Framework  
 
Source: authors‟ illustration. 
4.1   Ultimate sources of growth  
The core of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ‟s theory on development among former colonies focuses 
on ultimate sources of growth and development, that is, a range of factors interacting in 
shaping institutions in the long run. The timing of the historical shock of colonization and its 
consequences were driven by two types of factor endowments. First, geographic conditions 
(mineral resources, climate and soil quality) determined the commodities which could be 
most proﬁtably produced or harvested by the colonizers. These can be broadly grouped into 
plantation  or  mining  commodities  with  economies  of  scale,  such  as  sugar  and  certain 
minerals, and small-scale farming commodities with limited or no economies of scale, like 
wheat. Through factor endowments, geography deﬁned how attractive a region was for early 
colonizers as a whole and what type of settlement would come about. Second, demographic 
characteristics  (native  population  size  and  density)  then  determined  the  availability  of 
unskilled labor, the need to import slaves or contract workers to produce commodities with 
economies  of  scale,  and  subsequently  the  ratio  of  arriving  European  settlers  to  the  non-
European population. The unequal distribution of skills created economic inequality in favor 
of the scarce production factor skilled labor, which in the Americas was largely synonymous 
to diﬀerentiating between natives/slaves/contract laborers and people of European descent. 
The high degree of economic inequality in South America resulted in a dualistic political 




The resulting distribution of economic power then became institutionalized and 
was reﬂected in political inequalities – for example, through limited access to the ballot box 
and slow extension of the franchise in South America and the Caribbean. Hence, geographic 
and  demographic  conditions  feature  prominently  in  deﬁning  institutions,  which  in  turn 
aﬀected growth and very unequal social outcomes through a combination of intermediate 
social and economic policies and proximate sources of growth.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that local disease environments favorable or unfavorable to 
European mortality aﬀected the size of European settlements, the shape of institutions which 
the settlers built, and, as a result, the long-run growth outcomes in former colonies. Regions 
in which Europeans  expected high mortality rates received  fewer European migrants and 
inherited  extractive  institutions  created  by  small  elites.  By  contrast,  non-extractive 
institutions emerged in regions where Europeans could easily settle. For Acemoglu et al. 
(2001), expected settler mortality is hence a central part of the theory of colonial institutions 
and a  convenient tool  for econometric identiﬁcation. The “critical  juncture” of European 
colonialism then led to what Acemoglu et al. (2002) call a “reversal of fortune” among those 
countries and regions that were relatively highly developed at an early stage and other regions 
that were initially less highly developed. They link the start of the relative change in GDP per 
capita between colonies to the onset of the industrial revolution in 19th century. According to 
Acemoglu et al. (2002), former colonies with non-extractive institutions and well-protected 
private property took advantage of the opportunity to industrialize quickly, while powerful 
elites,  extractive  institutions  and  adverse  incentives  for  non-elites  barred  development  in 
extractive ex-colonies.  
Like Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) focus on the factors 
shaping institutions in the long-run and emphasize the preeminence of historical shocks, or 
critical junctures, in deﬁning the shape of institutions. However, the two theories diﬀer in 
three respects. First, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) emphasize the importance of constraints to 
European  colonization  over  factor  endowments.  Second,  they  attribute  a  weaker  role  to 
geography. Third, it is political inequality, not economic inequality, which determines the 
nature of growth-obstructing institutions.  
In their theory, geography exerts its inﬂuence through the local disease environment, not 
independently. Its role is exclusively indirect via the diseases that cause settler mortality. 
Over  time,  the  indigenous  populations  developed  partial  immunity  to  local  diseases. 
European settlers, on the contrary, faced almost certain death in some regions such as tropical 
Africa. Settler mortality interacted with population density, which itself has two meanings – 
one substantive and one methodological. On the one hand, European settlement was easier in 
regions with sparse and dispersed populations, but this eﬀect is less strong than the mortality 
eﬀect. On the other hand, population density serves as a proxy for early per capita income 
and helps to show how the initially relatively richer regions of settlement became poorer over 
                                                 
54  In  their  theory,  the  owners  of  scarce  skills  are  favored,  which  leads  to  economic  inequality.  When  this 
economic inequality becomes institutionalized, the elites gain eﬀective control over the entire resource base of 
the  economy.  This  comes  close  to  a  class-based  theory  of  development.  However,  the  term  “class”  is 
conspicuously absent in the modern institutional literature discussed in this paper.  47 
 
time and initially relatively poor regions of settlement became richer (reversal of fortune). 
Settler  mortality  and  population  density  determined  the  size  of  European  elites  and  the 
distribution of political power which subsequently shaped political and economic institutions. 
Institutions do not emerge semi-deterministically from factor endowments, but as a byproduct 
of the chances of Europeans to settle permanently or, in other words, as a byproduct of the 
degree to which they were building institutions for themselves. Stronger property rights and 
limits on executive power emerged where Europeans had settled in larger numbers. While 
most colonies were developing some forms of property rights and checks on power, the real 
pay-oﬀ for economic growth occurred only later during industrialization and only in those 
regions where the rights of larger segments of the population were protected, rather than just 
those of small elites.  
The analysis of Rodrik et al. (2004) does not oﬀer a unique theory of long-run growth of its 
own. Rather it examines competing explanations of long-run growth. By analyzing the eﬀects 
of institutions  (Acemoglu et  al.,  2001), trade integration (Frankel  and  Romer, 1999) and 
geography (Sachs, 2001; McArthur and Sachs, 2001) on long-run growth, they show how the 
inﬂuence  of  institutions  exceeds  that  of  all  other  factors.  However,  they  introduce  an 
important  qualiﬁcation,  namely  that  institutions  include  a  substantial  indirect  eﬀect  of 
geography which is not attributable to settler mortality. Compared to the other theoretical 
approaches,  Rodrik  et  al.  (2004)  do  not  provide  an  explicit  theory  of  how  geography 
inﬂuences institutions.  
While in theory restricted to former colonies, these explorations of ultimate causality helped 
to empirically identify the importance of more inclusive and more egalitarian institutions for 
long-run growth and outlined many of the factors involved in shaping them.
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They provide 
substantial  credibility  to  the  link  between  institutional  characteristics  and  later 
industrialization and the emergence of modern economic growth. It is, however, important 
not  to  overgeneralize  the  impact  attached  to  any  speciﬁc  factor.  For  example,  general 
population dynamics are a central component of the preindustrial economic dynamics, but a 
strict interpretation of the theories presented here would refer only to initial population size 
and density during colonization. Similarly, even theories stressing a deterministic inﬂuence of 
geographic factors such as factor endowments, location or climate on long-run growth leave 
substantial room for improving growth dynamics today, and the respective roles of political 
and economic inequality depend strongly on the country and time-speciﬁc political economy 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000b; Acemoglu et al., 2007).  
                                                 
55 The theories seem to suggest an almost linear relationship between institutionalized inequality and long run 
growth performance. This is highly misleading. Historically, industrialization has been associated with rapidly 
increasing inequality as some segments of the population and some segments of the economy forge ahead of 
others. Also since 1982, the inequalities of incomes and wealth have been increasing exponentially in the most 
advanced economies. The relationship between institutionalized inequality and long-run growth performance 
only holds in the very long run in cross-country comparisons. It states that countries with a historical legacy of 
institutionalized inequality will have lower per capita incomes today, while countries with a more egalitarian 
institutional legacy tend to have higher levels of per capita income.  48 
 
4.2  Intermediate sources of growth  
For Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) the intermediate sources of growth, i.e. economic 
policies, technology policies, political reforms and social policies in the broadest sense, are to 
some  degree  a  function  of  historically  developed  institutional  structures.  Countries  with 
egalitarian institutions based on comparatively homogeneous populations (e.g. the US and 
Canada) extended the  franchise  relatively fast,  provided universal  schooling and lowered 
access barriers to credit, ownership of land and protection of intellectual property. Countries 
with inegalitarian institutions, on the contrary, pursued policies of slow franchise extension, 
limited schooling and had high barriers to intellectual property rights and credit. Acemoglu et 
al. (2001, 2002) agree with this. They link policies to the distribution of political power 
between  elites  and  masses.  In  politically  unequal  societies,  the  ruling  elites  have  few 
incentives to invest in new technologies if these can threaten the basis of their power. In 
addition, their theory suggests that redistribution and franchise extension can serve as means 
of staving oﬀ social conﬂict or revolution and were, historically, often not directly aimed at 
increasing productive capacity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000b).  
There are many other intermediate sources of growth. Rodrik gives special attention to trade 
openness.  The  degree  of  integration  in  international  trade  interacts  positively  with  more 
inclusive institutions (signiﬁed by the arrow back to ultimate causes). But it only weakly 
aﬀects growth independently (Rodrik et al., 2004; Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005).
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Trade is in 
part  shaped  by  institutions  and  in  part  exogenously  determined  by  geographic  location, 
among other factors. While trade is often considered a “deep” determinant of growth, Rodrik 
ﬁnds its eﬀects are most pertinent in the medium and short term. Thus, Rodrik (1999) links 
growth collapses to an interaction between declines in the terms of trade (demand trends and 
openness), ultimate sources of growth and socioeconomic outcomes. Similarly, Hausmann et 
al.  (2005) show that  growth accelerations  are,  amongst  others, aﬀected by positive trade 
shocks  and  ﬁnancial  liberalization,  while  sustained  growth  is  associated  with  economic 
liberalization and positive regime changes. We can conceive of changes in the terms of trade 
changes,  ﬁnancial liberalization and economic reforms  as  intermediate  sources  of  growth 
(demand trends and economic policies in the broadest sense), which certainly aﬀect modern 
growth rates and stability, as well as socio-economic outcomes.  
Furthermore, the removal of “binding constraints”, which is so prominent in the Hausmann-
Rodrik-Velasco approach, can be seen as a typical intermediate source of growth. Removing 
binding constraints as a reform strategy links the ultimate sources of growth to the complex 
structure of national economies today. Analyzing binding constraints puts institutions into 
perspective and highlights that there is no uniform approach to improving institutions and 
governance,  as  these  are  historically  shaped  and  embedded  in  a  second-best  economy. 
According to Hausmann et al. (2005), successful growth policy needs to consider country-
speciﬁc  interactions  between  the  targeted  reform  and  the  incentives  provided  by  the 
prevailing political and economic structure. This approach suggests a diversity of institutional 
solutions to improve on factors inhibiting the proximate sources of growth. In our framework, 
                                                 
56 We rely on Rodrik et al. (2004) to have eﬀectively overturned the initial results of Frankel and Romer (1999) 
indicating a very large and independent eﬀect of trade integration.  49 
 
it belongs  to  the intermediate sources  of  growth, as  reforms are short  and medium  term 
interventions. The removal of binding constraints can create growth accelerations in the short 
run.  It  provides  a  window  of  opportunity  for  more  far-reaching  institutional  and  policy 
reforms which are required to sustain growth over longer periods.  
4.3   Proximate sources of growth  
The proximate sources of growth are directly aﬀected by both the institutional structure and 
the intermediate sources of growth. For Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002), this becomes 
visible  especially  during  industrialization,  where  previously  economic  successful 
heterogeneous societies with high degrees of institutionalized inequality became relatively 
less productive than more homogeneous societies. The importance of natural resources and 
cheap unskilled labor declined during industrialization, while the skill-premium increased 
greatly. The diﬀering institutional arrangements with regard to education, access to land and 
credit, and patents dramatically aﬀected aggregate eﬃciency. More homogeneous societies 
with low access barriers to economic activity tended to pull ahead of heterogeneous elite-
ruled societies.
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In addition, inegalitarian colonial institutions were associated with colonial 
drain.  Continued  colonial  plunder  of  economic  surpluses  further  disadvantaged  the  more 
unequal colonies.  
The  outcomes  of  proximate  causality  feed  back  into  the  institutional  structure,  as  the 
underlying initial distribution of rents between elites and the rest of society resulted in more 
egalitarian  ﬁnal  long-run  outcomes  in  initially  relatively  homogeneous  societies,  while 
inequality  remain  unchanged  or  become  even  larger  in  more  heterogeneous  elite-ruled 
societies. This eﬀect is so persistent, that both Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) ﬁnd that historical institutional structures still inﬂuence the 
proximate sources of growth today. However, while Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) 
stress  the  interplay  of  institutions,  a  wide  range  of  socio-economic  outcomes  and  the 
proximate sources of growth, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) argue more narrowly along the 
lines of North and Thomas (1973). Strong property rights foster economic activity and align 
social with private returns, as long as these rights apply to a large proportion of all economic 
actors.
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Institutions, as an ultimate source of growth, are directly linked to proximate causes 
of growth such as productivity, technology, and capital accumulation. For both theories, the 
increasing  skill-premium,  low  barriers  to  accessing  institutions  and  well-deﬁned  property 
rights  explain  the  “reversal  of  fortune”  among  former  colonies  occurring  with  onset  of 
industrialization and remain linked to the proximate sources of growth ever since.  
                                                 
57 Interestingly, this decline for reasons of not promoting domestic institutions seems to have been common 
knowledge at the time. For example, in 1795, Immanuel Kant writes “[t]he worst, or from the standpoint of 
ethical judgment the best, of all this is that no satisfaction is derived from all this violence, that all these trading 
companies stand on the verge of ruin, that the Sugar Islands, that seat of the most horrible and deliberate 
slavery, yield no real proﬁt, but only have their use indirectly and for no very praiseworthy object – namely, that 
of furnishing men to be trained as sailors for the men-of-war and thereby contributing to the carrying on of war 
in Europe” (Kant, 1903[1795], pp. 141–142).  
58 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) empirically conﬁrm this narrow focus in an empirical study of the long-run 
eﬀects of property rights versus contracting institutions. In this paper, they ﬁnd that well-deﬁned property rights 
have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on growth in the long run, investment and ﬁnancial development, while contracting 
institutions only exhibit positive and signiﬁcant second-order eﬀects on ﬁnancial intermediation.  50 
 
We can also interpret the concept of “binding constraints” not only as a reform strategy but as 
constraints placed on the economic actors, in eﬀect directly limiting their economic choices. 
These constraints can be of many kinds. Highly interventionist and bureaucratic economic 
policies can be a constraint on entrepreneurship. Bad macroeconomic policies can lead to 
macroeconomic  instability  which  adversely  aﬀects  all  actors‟  economic  incentives. 
Constraints can arise from institutional features, such as weak protection of property rights 
which limits invention, but also from too strong protection of property rights which limits 
imitation by enterprises in follower economies. Constraints can arise from insecure private 
property  rights  which  inhibit  the  actors‟  capacity  to  appropriate  returns  from  economic 
activity. Constraints can lie in socioeconomic outcomes, such as low human capital which as 
a proximate source of growth reduces an economy‟s productive capacity. Finally, constraints 
can also be exogenous and related to adverse geographic conditions such as landlockness or 
lack of infrastructure.  
4.4   Socio-economic outcomes  
In the theory of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002), inequalities in welfare outcomes and 
opportunities to take part in economic activities are intrinsically linked to the development of 
institutions and long-run growth outcomes. Especially in conjunction with historical shocks, 
initial  socio-economic  diﬀerences  in  outcomes  play  a  large  role  in  deﬁning  subsequent 
institutional structures. As we have seen, the ultimate sources of growth and development 
determine  the  long-run  shape  of  the  distribution  of  income  and  opportunities  to  market 
participation available to a majority of the population of a country. The intermediate sources, 
such as redistributive or schooling policies, can modify social outcomes and could thus act as 
a counterweight to long-run institutional inﬂuences. However, as noted before, policy itself is 
often a function of institutional structures, so degrees of freedom in policy are not unlimited. 
The proximate sources of growth ﬁnally determine growth rates and levels of GDP per capita 
in the short-run, and thus directly aﬀect social outcomes.  
Social  outcomes  feed  back  into  ultimate,  intermediate  and  proximate  sources  of  growth 
contributing  to  institutional  path  dependence.  Economic  inequality  and  inequality  of 
opportunity help to maintain institutions of limited access. For example, people who cannot 
vote cannot redistribute income and wealth towards themselves without revolt, and lack of 
access  to  education  will  result  in  lower  growth,  technological  change  and  economic 
eﬃciency. These links are weaker and less multifaceted in the theory of Acemoglu et al. 
(2001, 2002) than in Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002). For Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) 
the persistence of institutions is rather exclusively determined by the distribution of political 
power. In other words, political inequality trumps economic inequality and is conceptualized 
not  as  an  independent  outcome,  but  a  central  characteristic  of  what  deﬁnes  „good‟ 
institutions.  Beyond  this,  welfare  outcomes  matter  for  the  survival  of  non-democratic 
regimes, but they place less of an emphasis on the interaction between ultimate causes and 
social outcomes, as compared to Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002).  
Rodrik (1999) further connects socio-economic outcomes to growth performance in the short 
and medium term. His theory and evidence show how trade shocks interact with latent social 
conﬂict and harm growth especially in countries with underdeveloped conﬂict management 51 
 
institutions (including limited democracy).
59 Social conﬂict expresses itself in a high degree 
of income inequality, high rates of crime, or other indicators of inequalities in welfare and 
opportunities. In this view, institutions for growth are also institutions of social cohesion and 
macroeconomic stability, which transcends a narrow focus on property rights institutions only 
(Rodrik, 2000).  
5.  CONCLUSION  
Overall, we ﬁnd support in the literature for the three working hypotheses formulated at the 
beginning of this paper. With regard to the ﬁrst hypothesis, institutional arrangements do in 
fact  shape  long-run  economic  growth.  This  conclusion  has  been  underlined  in  theory  by 
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), but also draws on a 
wide-array  of  econometric  support  (Acemoglu  et  al.,  2001,  2002;  Rodrik  et  al.,  2004; 
Easterly,  2007).  Interestingly,  slavery  itself  emerges  as  detrimental  for  long-run  growth 
beyond  its  eﬀect  on  inequality  (Nunn,  2008a)  and  the  mechanisms  through  which  it 
negatively aﬀects growth diﬀer strongly from former slave importing countries in the New 
World to former slave exporting countries in Africa (Nunn, 2008b).  
The second hypothesis, that political and economic inequality aﬀects growth (a) indirectly via 
its eﬀects on institutions and (b) directly via the proximate sources of growth also  ﬁnds 
support in the literature. Econometric tests of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ‟s theory reveal that 
structural  economic  inequality  harms  not  only  institutions  and  growth,  but  also  limits 
investment in schooling (Easterly, 2007). Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997, 2002) themselves 
present qualitative evidence for a wide range of institutions which is consistent with the 
second hypothesis.  
Explaining the historically lagging development of schooling and literacy in Latin America 
and the Caribbean as compared to the USA and Canada, as the consequence of economically 
and politically exclusive institutions, shows how human capital accumulation was inhibited 
over  time.  This  pattern  of  limited  access  to  speciﬁc  institutions  extends  to  banking  and 
patents,  which  are  vital  for  increasing  aggregate  eﬃciency,  capital  accumulation  and 
technological change. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2005) maintain that these eﬀects, in many 
cases, originated from economic inequality, which only later transformed itself into political 
inequality. On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2007) argue that political inequality matters 
more than economic inequality in most circumstances.  
The third hypothesis directly addresses the issue of persistence of institutionalized political 
and economic inequality over time. All empirical studies and models discussed in this paper 
generally conclude that early institutions still aﬀect institutions today (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 
2002; Rodrik et al., 2004). By extension, present day inequalities in income are in part shaped 
by the historical development of institutions (Easterly, 2007). In fact, without time-persistent 
institutions,  empirical  studies  of  long-run  growth  would  fail  to  corroborate  most  of  the 
relationships discussed in this paper.  
                                                 
59 The correlation between institutions and the volatility of growth performances is supported by plenty of 
additional  research  aiming  to  establish  a  causal  relationship  (e.g.  Acemoglu,  Johnson,  Robinson  and 
Thaicharoen, 2003; Mobarak, 2005). 52 
 
Nevertheless, this line of research on institutions still faces major methodological, empirical 
and theoretical problems. For a large part, these arise from the attempt to reconcile a quest for 
parsimony with ambitious research agendas, while facing considerable empirical diﬃculties. 
For  example,  the  empirical  conclusions  about  the  eﬀects  of  institutions  and  policies  on 
contemporary  growth  outcomes  are  at  best  still  tentative.  The  analysis  of  growth 
accelerations rather than just growth rates, leads to unexpected and interesting ﬁndings, but 
why growth accelerations occur remains largely unexplained. Further, the eﬀects of political 
and economic inequality remain ambiguous, because they are still imperfectly quantiﬁed or 
sometimes not empirically distinguished at all.  
Some reject this type of institutional analysis entirely, on the grounds that institutions are 
completely endogenous (Przeworski, 2004a,b). However, all of the reviewed theories allow 
for  institutional  changes  and  simply  argue  that  there  is  persistence  to  some  degree  and 
considerable evidence of, for example, the lasting eﬀects of colonial heritage.  
The role of  geography  and, to  a lesser extent, diseases  is  still contested. A considerable 
branch of the long-run literature argues for both direct and indirect eﬀects of geography on 
development (McArthur and Sachs, 2001; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001), whereas 
Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) show that geography only indirectly 
aﬀects growth through institutions. But even these indirect eﬀects are very large. In line with 
such  ﬁndings,  Engerman  and  Sokoloﬀ  (1997,  2002)  place  a  much  higher  emphasis  on 
geographical factors as historical determinants of institutions than Acemoglu et al. (2001, 
2002).  Moreover,  there  are  grounds  to  doubt  the  success  of  the  instrumental  variables 
strategies employed by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and Rodrik et al. (2004), as pointed out 
by Albouy (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2004). Likewise, Easterly‟s (2007) application of a 
colonial theory to the entire world is questionable.  
In all of these analyses, institutions are still treated as an aggregate “black-box”. Too often, 
the  focus  is  exclusively  on  property  rights  related  variables  only,  such  as  the  risk  of 
expropriation, the rule of law or constraints on the executive. A pure property rights focus 
neglects  the  interactions  among  diﬀerent  types  of  institutions  in  bringing  about  stability, 
social cohesion and safe investment climates.  
Much  still  needs  to  be  added  to  these  investigations,  such  as  studying  the  eﬀects  of 
institutional  characteristics  in  more  speciﬁc  historical  contexts  in  a  Gerschenkronian 
tradition,  investigating  the  interactions  between  speciﬁc  institutional  domains  and 
technological  advance,  and  developing  a  broader  approach  to  institutions  which  is  not 
exclusively focused on property rights only. Such approaches will require better measurement 
of a variety of institutional characteristics and better empirical methods to separate these into 
distinct and meaningful dimensions. 53 
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